Ryan Darr

Consequentialism has for over two centuries been among the most influential approaches to moral philosophy and public policy in the Anglophone world. It is often seen as the paradigmatic modern rational and secular ethic, a product of the radical Enlightenment. This book, which offers a new account of its origins, demonstrates that its history is decidedly theological. A consequentialist approach to ethics is not, as is sometimes assumed, self-evidently rational once religious morality is stripped away. Consequentialist moral rationality itself had to be invented, and its invention occurred among religious ethicists in the theological debates of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Over a century before the first texts of the “classical utilitarians,” mid-seventeenth century thinkers developed the consequentialist moral cosmology, which is the earliest source of consequentialism. The book traces the emergence of this view among theological opponents of ethical voluntarism, its development up to the early eighteenth century, and its eventual breakdown in the face of a new version of the theological problem of evil – a breakdown that led directly to the birth of eighteenth-century theological utilitarianism. The result is a strikingly different picture of the history of one of our most influential and enduring ethical traditions. The conclusion of the book argues that the history of theological consequentialism illuminates current debates about consequentialism. It demonstrates that influential objections to consequentialism are a product of its particular history. In light of the history and objections, it proposes a non-consequentialist approach to teleological ethics indebted to seventeenth-century thinkers.

Over the last decade, a number of climate ethicists have turned their attention to the question of individual moral obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Important problems face their efforts, especially what is called the problem of inconsequentialism. The problems, I argue, arise largely from the failure to treat individual obligations as a matter of justice, a failure that stems from the common modern assumption that justice primarily concerns social institutions. I develop an alternative approach by appealing to the account of justice as a virtue in Thomas Aquinas. This approach allows us to talk about individual obligations to reduce emissions as obligations of justice, even in the current context of institutional failure. At the same time, I argue that approaching climate change in Thomistic terms requires an important modification of Aquinas’s understanding of justice.

The harms that will result from climate change are so spatiotemporally distant from and complexly related to the acts that cause them that the commonsense concept of moral responsibility can seem inadequate. For this reason, Dale Jamieson has raised the possibility that climate change might represent not simply a moral failure but a failure of morality itself. The result could be a climate disaster for which no one is morally responsible. Debates about the adequacy of commonsense morality, however, often rely on an overly simplistic picture of it. This essay proposes a more adequate picture of commonsense morality, which allows for both a more nuanced account of its role in the problem of climate change and a more satisfying account of individual moral responsibility for contributions to climate change.

Justice, according to Thomas Aquinas, is a personal virtue. Modern theorists, by contrast, generally treat justice as a virtue of social institutions. Jean Porter rightly argues that both perspectives are necessary. But how should we conceive the relationship between the virtue of justice and the justice of institutions? I address this question by drawing from Aquinas's account of the role of the convention of money in mediating relations of just exchange. Developing Aquinas's account, I defend two conclusions and raise one problem. The conclusions are: (1) Aquinas does presuppose the need for just institutions in just relations; (2) Aquinas highlights the importance of an underappreciated consideration: the way institutions mediate just or unjust relationships. The problem, which naturally arises from bringing together the virtue of justice and the justice of institutions, is whether and how individuals can act justly in a context of structural injustice.

In his widely read book, Five Types of Ethical Theory (1930), C.D. Broad introduced the distinction between two approaches to ethics: teleology and deontology. In the second half of the twentieth century, these terms found their way into Christian ethics, giving rise to a problem. Christian ethics seems to be straightforwardly teleological, but it also seems to be straightforwardly deontological. In this article, I argue that the problem is largely a product of the way teleology is construed: the ends in teleological ethics are implicitly assumed to be outcomes or states of affairs. I demonstrate the point through a reading of both the early philosophical sources and the more recent works of Charles Camosy and John Perry. I then argue that major sources in the Christian tradition, including those used by Camosy and Perry, are better understood as offering a more expansive picture of teleology in which ends are not always outcomes or states of affairs. I conclude by arguing that this...

The question of the viability of theological eudaimonism as an interpretation of the moral life has generated increasing debate in recent years. This essay aims to advance the debate about theological eudaimonism (and eudaimonism more generally) by addressing a closely related but insufficiently discussed issue: the nature of human agency and its relationship to value. The most commonly raised objection to eudaimonism is that it is objectionably agent-oriented. I argue that worries about objectionable self-orientation often stem from importing foreign pictures of agency into the eudaimonist tradition. I make this case through an analysis of Nicholas Wolterstorff's recent critique of eudaimonism. Wolterstorff presupposes a common contemporary conception of agency. Drawing on Thomas Aquinas and Elizabeth Anderson, I show that other conceptions of agency are available. Clarity about the nature of human agency and its relationship to value will bring greater clarity to the debate about eudaimonism and self-orientation.

Over the last two decades, a growing philosophical literature has subjected virtue ethics to empirical evaluation. Drawing on results in social psychology, a number of critics have argued that virtue ethics depends upon false presuppositions about the cross-situational consistency of psychological traits. Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue has been a prime target for the situationist critics. This essay assesses the situationist critique of MacIntyre's account of virtue. It argues that MacIntyre's social teleological account of virtue is not what his situationist critics take it to be. Virtues, for MacIntyre, are not reducible to psychological traits. They are qualities of one's socially constituted character, and their intelligibility as virtues derives from their role in the narrative of one's life. Recognizing this both clarifies and complicates debates about the implication of situationist social psychology for virtue ethics. KEYWORDS virtue, character, Alasdair MacIntyre, Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, empirical psychology, situationism Ryan Darr is a doctoral candidate in religious studies at Yale University. He works primarily in Christian ethics, moral philosophy, and early modern ethics.

Over the last decade, a number of climate ethicists have turned their attention to the question of individual moral obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Important problems face their efforts, especially what is called the problem of inconsequentialism. The problems, I argue, arise largely from the failure to treat individual obligations as a matter of justice, a failure that stems from the common modern assumption that justice primarily concerns social institutions. I develop an alternative approach by appealing to the account of justice as a virtue in Thomas Aquinas. This approach allows us to talk about individual obligations to reduce emissions as obligations of justice, even in the current context of institutional failure. At the same time, I argue that approaching climate change in Thomistic terms requires an important modification of Aquinas' understanding of justice.

Many of the most pressing moral problems that face our world are structural problems. Problems of this nature present difficulties for Christian ethicists because structural features tend to undermine conditions for the attribution of individual moral responsibility. This essay proposes an approach to this problem that reconciles a social account of sin with individual moral responsibility. Two key moves drive this proposal. First, I argue for a sharper distinction between sin and moral wrongdoing than is common. Second, I argue that both sin and individual moral responsibility ought to be understood socially. This proposal addresses deep conceptual problems and points practical efforts in a new direction.

The harms that will result from climate change are so spatiotemporally distant from and complexly related to the acts that cause them that the commonsense concept of moral responsibility can seem inadequate. For this reason, Dale Jamieson has raised the possibility that climate change might represent not simply a moral failure but a failure of morality itself. The result could be a climate disaster for which no one is morally responsible. Debates about the adequacy of commonsense morality, however, often rely on an overly simplistic picture of it. This essay proposes a more adequate picture of commonsense morality, which allows for both a more nuanced account of its role in the problem of climate change and a more satisfying account of individual moral responsibility for contributions to climate change.

Justice, according to Thomas Aquinas, is a personal virtue. Modern theorists, by contrast, generally treat justice as a virtue of social institutions. Jean Porter rightly argues that both perspectives are necessary. But how should we conceive the relationship between the virtue of justice and the justice of institutions? I address this question by drawing from Aquinas’s account of the role of the convention of money in mediating relations of just exchange. Developing Aquinas’s account, I defend two conclusions and raise one problem. The conclusions are: (1) Aquinas does presuppose the need for just institutions in just relations; (2) Aquinas highlights the importance of an underappreciated consideration: the way institutions mediate just or unjust relationships. The problem, which naturally arises from bringing together the virtue of justice and the justice of institutions, is whether and how individuals can act justly in a context of structural injustice.