Pennsylvania’s democracy is at a critical juncture. Weaknesses in the security of our elections present a threat both to our electoral outcomes and to public faith and trust in government of, by, and for the people. We have been fortunate thus far to avoid such an assault on our democracy.
Recognizing the gravity of what is at stake, The Blue Ribbon Commission on Pennsylvania’s Election Security (which we co-chair) endeavored to research and analyze the security of the Commonwealth’s election architecture. The commission’s just-released report, which documents those efforts and offers actionable and achievable solutions, provides a blueprint for how Pennsylvania’s leaders can do what is needed to protect our elections.
We launched the commission to bring together experts and leaders from across the state, of all political stripes, with the clear goal of improving Pennsylvania’s election security before it is too late. The commission’s independence from any governmental body—The Heinz Endowments and the Charles H. Spang Fund of The Pittsburgh Foundation provided support—gave us an advantage in our work, and the commission (hosted by the University of Pittsburgh’s Institute for Cyber Law, Policy and Security) benefited from collaboration with Verified Voting and Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute CERT Division.
During the course of our work over the past eight months, the commission and its staff conducted extensive research, solicited comments from the public, received presentations from experts in the field and state and local officials, attended a demonstration of new voting systems available in Pennsylvania, and issued interim recommendations.
Those recommendations focused on the most pressing danger to our state’s elections: the prevalence of vulnerable, paperless direct-recording electronic systems (or “DREs”). According to Verified Voting, 83% of Pennsylvania voters used these paperless machines in the November 2018 mid-term elections. Without a voter-marked paper ballot, counties using these paperless systems cannot support meaningful recounts and post-election audits needed to instill confidence in the vote count. Further, as the commission’s report describes in more detail, DREs are susceptible to technological errors and hacking.
The commission’s report also identified other weaknesses in Pennsylvania’s election security, including in the voter registration system—which we know that nation-state adversaries have targeted in the past—and county election management systems. And potential gaps in contingency planning could be the difference between a minor disruption in voting and a full-blown crisis on Election Day.
Pennsylvania can do better. The commission’s report offers solutions to these, and other, vulnerabilities.
To address the most pressing threat, we must replace DREs with systems that use paper ballots marked by the voter (either by hand or by ballot-marking device) and institute mandatory, statistically-sound post-election audits after every election. These two steps are critical to protecting the public’s trust in our elections and providing the means of recovery in the event of attack or technological error affecting vote counts.
The commission offers a variety of additional recommended actions. As our report describes in far more detail, Pennsylvania officials must improve the security of county election management systems; strengthen and eventually replace the voter registration system; and ensure Pennsylvania can recover in the event of an attack or other disaster. And we must support our local election officials with resources and training.
To be sure, implementing these best practices is not assured without Pennsylvanians’ support. For example, estimates of the cost of replacing voting systems statewide exceed $100 million: no small sum but less than $10 per Pennsylvanian. The governor’s reported willingness to seek funding support for counties this coming fiscal year is encouraging, and we strongly urge the General Assembly to support this request. Elections—and our faith therein—are not free.
Officials at all levels of government in Pennsylvania, from both political parties, must come together to protect our elections. The Blue Ribbon Commission on Pennsylvania’s Election Security strived to provide a roadmap for how to achieve just that. The stakes for our democracy are too high to ignore this call to action.
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David Hickton is the founding director of the University of Pittsburgh Institute for Cyber Law, Policy, and Security and the former U.S. attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Paul McNulty is the president of Grove City College and the former deputy attorney general of the United States. They are co-chairs of The Blue Ribbon Commission on Pennsylvania’s Election Security.