Award Abstract # 2153768
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: The Next Generation of Leakage Attacks and Defenses for Encrypted Databases

NSF Org: CNS
Division Of Computer and Network Systems
Recipient: YALE UNIV
Initial Amendment Date: July 14, 2022
Latest Amendment Date: August 31, 2023
Award Number: 2153768
Award Instrument: Continuing Grant
Program Manager: Anna Squicciarini
asquicci@nsf.gov
 (703)292-5177
CNS
 Division Of Computer and Network Systems
CSE
 Direct For Computer & Info Scie & Enginr
Start Date: July 15, 2022
End Date: June 30, 2025 (Estimated)
Total Intended Award Amount: $400,000.00
Total Awarded Amount to Date: $400,000.00
Funds Obligated to Date: FY 2022 = $129,055.00
FY 2023 = $270,945.00
History of Investigator:
  • Charalampos Papamanthou (Principal Investigator)
    charalampos.papamanthou@yale.edu
Recipient Sponsored Research Office: Yale University
150 MUNSON ST
NEW HAVEN
CT  US  06511-3572
(203)785-4689
Sponsor Congressional District: 03
Primary Place of Performance: Yale University
CT  US  06511-8937
Primary Place of Performance
Congressional District:
03
Unique Entity Identifier (UEI): FL6GV84CKN57
Parent UEI: FL6GV84CKN57
NSF Program(s): Secure &Trustworthy Cyberspace
Primary Program Source: 01002324DB NSF RESEARCH & RELATED ACTIVIT
01002223DB NSF RESEARCH & RELATED ACTIVIT
Program Reference Code(s): 025Z, 7924
Program Element Code(s): 806000
Award Agency Code: 4900
Fund Agency Code: 4900
Assistance Listing Number(s): 47.070

ABSTRACT

growing number of works explore the area of encrypted databases as a practical approach to searching on encrypted data stored at a server. The client encrypts the data before uploading it to the server. The server is not given the decryption key, yet the server can execute searches on the encrypted data requested by the client and return the corresponding encrypted answers. An encrypted database efficiently achieves the above functionality by allowing some leakage about the original (plaintext) data that appears harmless but could be exploited by an attacker who attempts to reconstruct the original data by synthesizing leakage from the encrypted answers and encrypted queries over time.

This project aims to develop the next generation of methods for building efficient encrypted databases and for analyzing their resilience to reconstruction attacks. To achieve this goal, it uses methods from algorithms, statistics, geometry, databases, and computer systems. Specific research activities include cryptanalysis of the leakage from encrypted databases with suppressed leakage as well as cryptanalysis and schemes for high-dimensional encrypted queries. Informed by the above research thrusts, this project will develop a principled analysis of defenses as well as a framework for quantifying the impact of leakage in the context of encrypted databases.

Toward achieving broader impacts, this project includes curriculum development for computer security courses, efforts to include members of underrepresented groups in research activities, and outreach to industry and government audiences.

This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

Please report errors in award information by writing to: awardsearch@nsf.gov.

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