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5 6 7 8 9	KENNETH J. ROSE, Bar No. 114247 ROBERT H. ROSE, Bar No. 277893 THE ROSE GROUP, APLC 10021 Willow Creek Road, Suite 200 San Diego, CA 92131 Tel: (619) 822-1088; Fax: (708) 575-1495 Attorneys for Plaintiff Denise Dalaimo Nussbaum		
10		E THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
11	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE		
12	Denise Dalaimo Nussbaum, an individual,	Case No.: RIC1506005	
13 14 15 16 17	Plaintiff, vs. Gary Vargas, an individual; Mount San Jacinto College District ("MSJC"); Roger W. Schultz, in his individual and official capacity as Superintendent/President of	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 1. ASSAULT 2. BATTERY 5. FALSE IMPRISONMENT 4. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS	
18 19 20 21	MSJC; and Jack Miyamoto, in his individual and official capacity as Vice President of Human Resources of MSJC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.	5. NEGLIGENCE 6. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LIABILITY OF PUBLIC ENTITY 7. SEX / GENDER DISCRIMINATION 8. SEXUAL HARASSMENT 9. RETALIATION 10. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY	
222324		DEPT: S302 JUDGE: Angel M. Bermudez	
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

- 1. At all times mentioned herein, Plaintiff Denise Dalaimo Nussbaum ("Plaintiff"), a woman, was, and is now, an individual and a resident of the County of San Diego, State of California, employed as a Professor of Sociology at Mount San Jacinto College District, also known as Mount San Jacinto College ("MSJC"), in the County of Riverside. Until the recent events set forth herein, Plaintiff served as Chair of the Department of Sociology at MSJC.
- 2. At all times mentioned herein, Defendant Gary Vargas ("Defendant Vargas") was, and is now, an individual and a resident of the State of California, employed as a Professor of History at MSJC in the County of Riverside.
- 3. At all times mentioned herein, MSJC was, and is now, a public entity whose principal place of business is in San Jacinto, California, in the County of Riverside.
- 4. At all times mentioned herein, Defendant Roger W. Schultz ("Defendant Schultz") was, and is now, an individual and resident of the State of California, employed as the Superintendent/President of MSJC.
- 5. At all relevant times mentioned herein, Defendant Jack Miyamoto ("Defendant Miyamoto") was, and is now, an individual and resident of the State of California, employed as the Vice President of Human Resources at MSJC.
- 6. Defendant DOES 1 through 10 are sued under fictitious names pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 474. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that each defendant sued under such fictitious name is in some manner responsible for the wrongs and damages alleged herein, and in so acting was functioning as the agent, servant, partner, employee, co-conspirator, and/or aider and abettor of one or more of the named Defendants, and in doing the actions mentioned herein, was acting within the course and scope of his or her authority as such agent, servant, partner and/or employee, and/or was acting with the permission, consent, and/or knowledge of one or more of the other Defendants.
- 7. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that at all times herein mentioned, each Defendant, whether individual or corporate, or otherwise, was the agent of one or more of the other named Defendants in doing the things herein alleged, was acting within the course

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and scope of such agency or employment and with the permission, ratification, and consent of one or more of the other Defendants.

- Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that at all times herein mentioned, each Defendant conspired with and/or aided and abetted one or more of the other Defendants in the wrongful acts described herein.
- 9. On April 10, 2015, Plaintiff attended an "all-faculty" meeting of about 100 professors and administrators of MSJC at MSJC's Temecula Campus, 27447 Enterprise Circle West, Temecula, California. Defendant Vargas was also present at this meeting.
- 10. For nearly two months prior to April 10, 2015, Plaintiff had been the victim of a campaign of harassment by Defendant Vargas and other MSJC faculty members and students due to her vocal opposition to plans by certain faculty to sponsor anti-Israel activist Miko Peled for a speech on campus.
- 11. Due to this harassment and as a form of silent, civil protest, Plaintiff wore a "sandwich board" sign to the April 10, 2015, all-faculty meeting. Plaintiff had written on the sign statements calling for academic integrity, and quotes by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. She also brought to the meeting pamphlets and handouts concerning Israel.
- 12. During the all-faculty meeting, Plaintiff removed the sign and leaned it against the wall near the table where she was sitting. After a break in the meeting, Plaintiff returned to discover the sign was missing.
- 13. After a few moments, Plaintiff discovered the sign had been taken without her permission by another MSJC professor, Bob Melsh, who was standing with Defendant Vargas, Shahla Razavi, and Jim Davis. Mesh, Razavi and Davis are professors at MSJC.
- 14. Plaintiff walked over to Melsh and took the sign back from him, emphasizing to him that "this is my private property." After she took back the sign, Defendant Vargas, Melsh, Razavi, and Davis began to argue with Plaintiff.
- 15. During this argument, Plaintiff informed Defendant Vargas that she had received a complaint from a female MSJC student who said that Defendant Vargas had recently made antifeminist and misogynistic comments at an Honors Seminar. Plaintiff informed Defendant Vargas

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that the student had expressed to Plaintiff that she felt insulted and intimidated by Defendant Vargas's comments and demeanor toward women in general and that Defendant Vargas had disrespected a female professor who was present at the Honors seminar. Plaintiff was aware of Defendant Vargas's hostility and animus toward women who advocated for or on behalf of feminist ideals.

- 16. Defendant Vargas began yelling in Plaintiff's face, "Who is she? Who is she? Have her come to me! Have her say that to my face! She can say it to my face!" Because the student had requested that her identity remain confidential, insofar as she feared retaliation from Defendant Vargas and/or others, Plaintiff refused to break the student's confidence and told Defendant Vargas "Not a chance! She's afraid of you! You're a bully! She'll never come talk to you!"
- 17. At this point, the all-faculty meeting was called back into order, and Plaintiff turned away from Defendant Vargas to return to her seat. However, before she could do so, Defendant Vargas violently grabbed and gripped Plaintiff's left arm so tightly that Plaintiff could not move, and he shouted at her, "No, let's talk more about the Honors Seminar." Plaintiff tried to release her arm from Defendant Vargas's grip, but was unsuccessful due to Defendant Vargas's superior physical strength. Plaintiff told Defendant Vargas, clearly and loudly, "TAKE YOUR HANDS OFF ME!" However, instead of releasing or even loosening his tight grip on Plaintiff's left arm, Defendant Vargas intensified his grip causing Plaintiff intense pain, and Defendant Vargas repeated loudly, "No, let's talk about the Honors Seminar." Plaintiff looked Defendant Vargas straight in the eyes and yelled, "LET GO OF MY ARM!!!" loudly enough for most of those present at the all-faculty meeting to hear her. Only, at this point, as Defendant Vargas realized many people were watching him, did he finally loosen his grip slightly enough for Plaintiff to pull away from him by yanking her arm forcefully. Defendant Vargas' tortious conduct was motivated and directed toward Plaintiff as a woman and arose out of a discussion of Defendant Vargas's past history of sex/gender discrimination and sexual harassment.
- 18. After Defendant released Plaintiff's arm, Plaintiff immediately left the building and did not return to the meeting. Due to Defendant's assault, Plaintiff's left arm was visibly bruised, she was in a large amount of pain, was, and continues to be, emotionally distraught, and fears for her

safety.

- 19. That same day, Plaintiff informed Defendant Schultz and other MSJC administration officials by email of Defendant Vargas's unwanted physical attack. This email was followed up on April 13, 2015, with a formal complaint (also via email) to Defendant Schultz and other MSJC administration officials ("April 13th Administrative Complaint").
- 20. In fact, Plaintiff's April 13th Administrative Complaint referenced Plaintiff's earlier April 3, 2015, formal complaint to Defendant Schultz about harassment and a hostile work environment Plaintiff was suffering arising from Plaintiff's pro-Israel and pro-Jewish identification and positions ("April 3rd Administrative Complaint") (the April 3rd Administrative Complaint and the April 13th Administrative Complaint are collectively referred to herein as "Administrative Complaints").
- 21. Pursuant to MSJC formal written policies promulgated pursuant to California state law and regulations, on or about April 22, 2015, MSJC employed an outside investigator, Pat McCurry of Pat McCurry and Associates ("Investigator"), purportedly to conduct an impartial fact-finding investigation of Plaintiff's Administrative Complaints ("Investigation").
- 22. On or about May 11, 2015, the Investigator interviewed Plaintiff regarding the facts relevant to her Administrative Complaints.
- 23. On information and belief, at the time of Plaintiff's interview, MSJC was represented by the law firm of Currier & Hudson. Plaintiff and her counsel, The Rose Group law firm, were unaware of Currier & Hudson's representation of MSJC. Currier & Hudson is also counsel of record to Defendant Vargas in this lawsuit.
- 24. After listening to Plaintiff's description of the events surrounding Defendant Vargas's physical assault, the Investigator recommended to Plaintiff that she lodge a criminal complaint against Defendant Vargas with the Riverside County Sheriff's Department, in addition to pursuing the Administrative Complaints.
- 25. The following day, Plaintiff's counsel emailed the Investigator documentation supporting Plaintiff's Administrative Complaints and photos of bruises she incurred as a result of being assaulted by Defendant Vargas.

- 26. On May 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this matter against Defendant Vargas, alleging damages arising from Defendant Vargas's tortious conduct of assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and negligence.
- 27. Soon after, Defendant Vargas was served with the summons and complaint in this matter, and he promptly notified Defendant Schultz and MSJC. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff and her counsel at the time, MSJC retained the very attorneys representing MSJC for purposes of the "independent" Investigation, Kendall Swanson and Andrea Naested of Currier & Hudson, to represent Vargas in this matter.
- 28. On May 18, 2015, Plaintiff appeared at the Riverside County Sheriff's Department for the purpose of filing a criminal complaint for assault against Vargas. The Riverside County Sheriff's Department informed Plaintiff that they could not accept the complaint because the MSJC Police Department had jurisdiction.
- 29. On May 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed a criminal complaint for assault against Vargas with the MSJC Police Department.
- 30. Several weeks later, Plaintiff's attorneys finally learned that the attorneys MSJC was paying to represent Vargas—Kendall Swanson, Andrea Naested, and others from the law firm of Currier & Hudson—were in fact representing MSJC with regard to all legal matters concerning the Investigation.
- 31. Beyond this obvious potential for a conflict of interest and corruption of both the appearance and the fact of an independent fact-finding investigation, during the pendency of this lawsuit and the Investigation, Kendall Swanson of Currier & Hudson also represented MSJC with regard to Plaintiff's request pursuant to California state law for workplace reasonable accommodations. Specifically, Plaintiff provided confidential medical information to MSJC regarding her medical disability arising from the emotional distress she was suffering as a result of Defendant Vargas's physical assault and the continuing hostile work environment at the MSJC campus.
- 32. In other words, attorney Kendall Swanson and her law firm Currier & Hudson had arranged matters with MSJC such that they were privy to confidential personnel information arising

from the Investigation and Plaintiff's confidential medical information relating to her statutory request for a work accommodation, all while representing Plaintiff's adversary, Defendant Vargas, in this litigation.

- 33. It did not take long for the appearance of a conflict of interest to become an actual conflict and for the independence of the Investigation to be undermined and corrupted, effectively to be used to retaliate against Plaintiff for taking her April 13th Administrative Complaint against Defendant Vargas public by filing this lawsuit.
- 34. Specifically, soon after the filing of this lawsuit, Defendant Miyamoto, MSJC's Vice President of Human Resources, instructed the Investigator to suspend the Investigation to allow Defendant Vargas's attorneys at Currier & Hudson time to conduct their own investigation.
- 35. On or about June 26, 2015, Plaintiff's attorneys contacted the Investigator to inquire about the status of the Investigation. The Investigator stated he had conducted just one additional witness interview since Plaintiff's interview on May 11 because Defendant Miyamoto had instructed him to suspend the Investigation due to the recent involvement of the attorneys representing Vargas in this litigation.
- 36. During the pendency of the Investigation, MSJC personnel worked with Defendant Vargas's attorneys at Currier & Hudson to run a shadow investigation by setting up interviews for Defendant Vargas's lawyers with MSJC employee-witnesses, thereby allowing Vargas's attorneys improper access for engaging witnesses critical to the "independent" Investigation.
- 37. Indeed, by the time the Investigator got around to interviewing these witnesses in August of 2015, key elements of witness testimony had changed from earlier contemporaneous written statements about the event in ways that strongly suggest that the witnesses had been coached to describe the physical assault in a way that would exculpate Defendant Vargas.
- 38. The Investigator was fully aware of this improper shadow investigation conducted by Vargas's attorneys and assisted by MSJC personnel, but he said nothing to MSJC by way of admonition or in protest nor did the Investigator or anyone at MSJC inform Plaintiff and her attorneys of this conduct.
 - 39. Further, during the Investigation witness interview process, the Investigator made no

effort to learn with whom the witnesses had met at Currier & Hudson, what was discussed, or if the witnesses had discussed their testimony with anyone else.

- 40. Most troubling, however, is the fact that Defendant Vargas' attorneys at Currier & Hudson had ongoing communications with the Investigator about the Investigation during the pendency of the Investigation relating to the actual substance of the Investigation. One example of this patently improper conduct occurred on or about June 17, 2015, when the Investigator mailed the verbatim transcript of his interview of Plaintiff to Defendant Vargas's attorney, Kendall Swanson of Currier & Hudson.
- 41. To understand the impropriety of this breach of confidentiality and impartiality, one need only read a letter from attorney Swanson, acting in her conflicted capacity as MSJC's attorney for purposes of the Investigation, wherein she scolds Plaintiff's attorney, Robert Rose of The Rose Group, as follows:

The District's Administrative Procedure 3410, Unlawful Discrimination, applicable to the District's investigation of Dr. Nussbaum's complaints, provides that "investigative processes can best be conducted within a confidential climate, and the District does not reveal information about such matters except as necessary to fulfill its legal obligations." AP 3410 also requires that the District "take reasonable steps to ensure the confidentiality of the investigation and to protect the privacy of all parties to the extent possible without impeding the District's ability to investigate and respond effectively to the complaint."

The District will advise you once the investigation is completed. Until that time, please refrain from contacting Mr. McCurry. If Mr. McCurry needs additional information from your client he will contact you.

- 42. The corruption of the Investigation and the retaliation against Plaintiff for filing the Administrative Complaints and this lawsuit extended even into the law enforcement process.
- 43. On July 9, 2015, Plaintiff left a voice message for new MSJC Police Chief Brown asking that he inform her of the status of the criminal complaint she filed with MSJC on or about May 19, 2015. Neither MSJC Police Chief Brown, nor anyone else from MSJC, returned Plaintiff's

voice message.

- 44. On July 15, 2015, Defendant Miyamoto responded to a July 1, 2015, letter addressed to Defendant Schultz from Plaintiff's attorneys. The July 1 letter sought explanations from MSJC why (1) MSJC instructed the Investigator to suspend the Investigation, (2) the MSJC Police Department had not been investigating Plaintiff's criminal charges against Defendant Vargas for assault, and (3) MSJC is paying Defendant Vargas's legal fees.
- 45. Defendant Miyamoto's July 15th letter misrepresented at least three important facts relating directly to, and demonstrating further the corruption of, the Investigation.
- 46. First, Defendant Miyamoto falsely represented that the "independent investigation . . . has not been suspended," when in fact it had been.
- 47. Second, Defendant Miyamoto falsely claimed that Plaintiff informed the MSJC Police Department as early as May 18, 2015, that she declined to pursue her criminal complaint against Defendant Vargas. Beyond the fact that this is a patently false statement, it begs credulity insofar as Plaintiff had taken the time to go first to the Riverside County Sheriff's Department only to be told that she must go to the MSJC Police Department to lodge her criminal complaint, which she most certainly did do.
- 48. Third, Defendant Miyamoto misrepresented the fact that MSJC had already sought the required extension from the State Chancellor to complete the Investigation after the required 90-day period. Specifically, California law requires that the Investigation be completed within 90 days of the submission of the Administrative Complaints (April 3 and 13, 2015). Further, California law requires that if MSCJ required an extension of time to complete the Investigation, MSJC was required to submit a written extension request to the State Chancellor and to provide Plaintiff a copy of such request and to inform Plaintiff that "she may file written objections with the State Chancellor within 5 days of receipt." California law further requires that any such extension request be submitted to the State Chancellor 10 days in advance of the 90-day deadline. (Ninety days from April 13, 2015, was July 12, 2015.)
- 49. Thus, Defendant Miyamoto attempted in his July 15 letter to give Plaintiff's counsel the impression that he had sought the extension previously ("already sought") and did so in a timely

fashion. This was patently false. As of July 15, 2015, Defendant Miyamoto had not even requested an extension. In fact, Defendant Miyamoto only sent a written extension request to the State Chancellor by no earlier than his letter dated July 29, 2015.

- 50. Further, in Defendant Miyamoto's July 15 letter, he asserts that he sought an extension to August 31, 2015. In fact, in his July 29 letter, he sought an extension on behalf of MSJC to October 3, 2015.
- 51. Finally, Defendants Miyamoto and MSJC never provided Plaintiff with a copy of the extension request (obviously because it would have exposed the ruse) and never provided Plaintiff with notice of the right to object.
- 52. On July 16, 2015, Plaintiff left another voice message for MSJC Police Chief Brown asking that he inform her of the status of the criminal complaint she filed with the MSJC Police Department on or about May 19, 2015. No one from MSJC, including MSJC Police Chief Brown, returned Plaintiff's voice message.
- 53. On July 28, 2015, Plaintiff left a voice message and sent an email to MSJC Police Chief Brown, copied to Defendant Schultz and MSJC's Vice President of Student Services Bill Vincent. Once again, Plaintiff asked if the MSJC Police Department was pursing her criminal complaint against Defendant Vargas. As in the past, no one from MSJC responded.
- 54. On July 31, 2015, MSJC representatives met with Plaintiff to discuss reasonable requests she had made to be assured a safe work environment if she returned to teach on campus during the Fall Semester. MSJC was represented at this meeting by Defendant Miyamoto, Brandon Moore, MSJC's Human Resources Analyst, Jeannine Stokes, and two lawyers from the law firm of Currier & Hudson (Kendall Swanson and Andrea Naested). Plaintiff's counsel requested that the lawyers from the law firm of Currier & Hudson be excused from the meeting due to a conflict of interest given their representation of Defendant Vargas in this litigation. Defendant Miyamoto acknowledged the meeting was private and confidential, yet refused Plaintiff's request that the Currier & Hudson attorneys be excluded from the meeting.
- 55. On August 4, 2015, Plaintiff's attorneys contacted the Investigator to again inquire about status of the Investigation, in light of Defendant Miyamoto's denial that MSJC and he ever

suspended the Investigation (*see* ¶¶ 45-46 above). The Investigator stated that MSJC told him to suspend the Investigation because Plaintiff had filed a lawsuit against Defendant Vargas. He also stated that recently MSJC told him to resume the Investigation. The Investigator acknowledged that he still had not interviewed Defendant Vargas, notwithstanding the fact that the Investigator had provided the confidential verbatim transcript of the Investigator's interview of Plaintiff, and other pertinent information, to Defendant Vargas's attorneys at Currier & Hudson.

56. On September 1, 2015, after Plaintiff's repeated attempts to ascertain the status of the criminal complaint lodged with the MSJC Police Department, the attorneys from the law firm of Currier & Hudson sent a letter to Plaintiff's counsel stating:

Effective July 31, 2015, the District's Police Department was disbanded. The District has contracted with Riverside County Sherriff's Department to provide campus police services. As such, Plaintiff's complaint was referred to Riverside County Sherriff's Department for handling. Please direct any inquiries regarding the status of the complaint to Riverside County Sherriff's Department.

- 57. In this letter, MSJC's attorney gratuitously repeated the lie that Plaintiff had "declined prosecution" when making her initial criminal complaint to the MSJC Police Department in May.
- 58. At no time prior to September 1, 2015, did MSJC or its MSJC Police Department inform Plaintiff that it no longer had jurisdiction over her criminal complaint against Defendant Vargas or that it transferred all of its police powers to the Riverside County Sheriff's Department. In fact, MSJC did not inform Plaintiff of the status of the criminal complaint until more than a month after MSJC apparently disbanded its police department, and then only to inform Plaintiff that MSJC no longer had responsibility for Plaintiff's pending criminal complaint.
- 59. The Investigator completed the Investigation and submitted his report of the Investigation ("Investigation Report") to MSJC on or about September 23-25, 2015. The Investigation Report is dated September 13, 2015.
- 60. The Investigation Report's conclusions were biased in favor of Defendant Vargas, and this is a direct and proximate result of the corruption of the Investigation set forth herein.

- 61. Specifically, notwithstanding witness statements corroborating Plaintiff's April 13th Administrative Complaint that Defendant Vargas did in fact grab or hold Plaintiff's forearm to prevent her from walking away from Defendant Vargas (*i.e.*, clearly an unwanted and inappropriate touching following an accusatory conversation about Defendant Vargas's history as someone who demeans and bullies young women), and notwithstanding corroborating statements from witnesses that they heard Plaintiff yell at Defendant Vargas at least once that "You need to let go of my arm," the Investigator concluded that Defendant Vargas did nothing more than gently touch Plaintiff.
- 62. The Investigation Report does not bother to explain under what circumstances a man, who is not friendly with the woman, in the course of an emotional verbal disagreement, appropriately touches the woman to prevent her from leaving and precisely at the time that the woman is walking away under circumstances that make it clear that she does not wish to remain.
- 63. The Investigation Report ignores entirely California law and MSJC administrative procedures that define and characterize physical harassment as follows:

<u>Inappropriate</u> or offensive <u>touching</u>, assault, or <u>physical interference with free</u>

<u>movement</u>. <u>This may include, but is not limited to</u>, kissing, patting, lingering or intimate touches, <u>grabbing</u>, pinching, leering, staring, unnecessarily brushing against <u>or</u>

<u>blocking another person</u>, whistling or sexual gestures.

MSJC Admin. Proc. 3430 (Prohibition of Harassment) (emphasis added).

64. Moreover, the Investigation Report ignores entirely California law and MSJC administrative procedures that define and characterize workplace violence as follows:

The following actions are considered violent acts:

- (A) Striking, punching, slapping or *assaulting another person*.
- (B) Fighting or challenging another person to fight.
- (C) Grabbing, pinching or *touching another person in an unwanted way* whether sexually or otherwise.
- (D) <u>Engaging in</u> dangerous, threatening or <u>unwanted</u> horseplay.
- MSJC Admin. Proc. 3510 (Workplace Violence Plan) (emphasis added).
 - 65. In a letter dated October 16, 2015, Defendant Miyamoto, on behalf of MSJC,

informed Plaintiff that MSJC had rejected Plaintiff's Administrative Complaints, and notably, had adopted in full the Investigation Report's conclusions regarding Defendant Vargas's physical assault of Plaintiff. Specifically, the October 16 letter concludes:

With respect to the allegations in your complaints against District employees, after reviewing the investigator's report, along with the attachments and transcribed witness interviews, I concur with the investigator's determination that there is no evidence to corroborate the allegations in your April 3rd and April 13th complaints. Specifically, there is insufficient evidence to support your allegations that you have been discriminated against and/or harassed by any of the accused employees. There is also insufficient evidence to corroborate your allegations that Mr. Vargas assaulted and battered you on April 10, 2015. The witnesses interviewed throughout the course of the investigation did not report violent, threatening, or aggressive conduct on Mr. Vargas' part.

- 66. MSJC's decision to reject Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Vargas are the direct result of a corrupt and biased Investigation determined to retaliate unlawfully against Plaintiff for filing the Administrative Complaints and this lawsuit. Moreover, MSJC's decision is advanced and made possible by a gender bias that artificially and improperly requires "violence, threatening, or aggressive conduct" to constitute unlawful physical harassment even in the face of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that there was a "touching [of] another person in an unwanted way," an "inappropriate or offensive touching" or "physical interference with free movement."
- 67. The bottom line is that the evidence overwhelmingly established that Plaintiff turned to withdraw from her heated conversation with Defendant Vargas. Plaintiff did not initiate any physical contact nor invite in any conceivable way physical contact from Defendant Vargas. Indeed, by turning to leave, Plaintiff's intent was manifestly just the opposite. Defendant Vargas reached out and grabbed (or, according to some witnesses, held on to) Plaintiff's forearm to prevent her from leaving.
- 68. Upon information and belief, MSJC did not discipline Defendant Vargas for the conduct described herein nor did MSJC impose any corrective measures against any party for the

conduct described herein.

- 69. All of the acts of MSJC described hereinabove were carried out by, or done at the instruction or behest of, Defendants Schultz and/or Miyamoto in their individual and/or official capacities. All of the tortious and/or unlawful conduct of Defendant Miyamoto described herein was committed in his individual capacity and/or in his official capacity as Vice President of Human Resources for MSJC. Specifically, but not exclusively, Defendants MSJC, Schultz, and Miyamoto favored Defendant Vargas over Plaintiff and further biased and corrupted the Investigation in favor of Defendant Vargas to Plaintiff's disadvantage because Defendant Vargas was a man and Plaintiff was a woman
- 70. All of the tortious and/or unlawful conduct of Defendant Schultz described herein was committed in his individual capacity and/or in his official capacity as Superintendent/President of MSJC.
- 71. Defendant Schultz knew or should have known of all of the tortious and/or unlawful conduct of Defendant Miyamoto described herein; that such conduct was committed on behalf of and/or at the behest of Defendant Schultz while acting under Defendant Schultz's control as an agent of Defendant Schultz and/or pursuant to an agreement between Defendants Schultz and Miyamoto as co-conspirators, and/or to aid and abet Defendant Schultz and was committed in his individual capacity and/or in his official capacity as Vice President of Human Resources of MSJC.
- 72. On September 30, 2015, Plaintiff submitted her Notice of Claim pursuant to and in compliance with the California Tort Claims Act, California Government Code §§ 900 *et seq.*, setting forth in particularity Plaintiff's claims against MSJC as set forth herein. On November 18, 2015, MSJC rejected Plaintiff's Notice of Claim.
- 73. On January 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Complaint of Employment Discrimination before the State of California Department of Fair Employment and Housing pursuant to and in compliance with the California Fair Employment and Housing Act §§ 12900 *et seq.*, setting forth in particularity Plaintiff's claims against MSJC as set forth herein ("MSJC FEH Complaint"). On January 27, 2016, Plaintiff received her right-to-sue notice from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing for the MSJC FEH Complaint.

74. On March 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Complaint of Employment Discrimination before the State of California Department of Fair Employment and Housing pursuant to and in compliance with the California Fair Employment and Housing Act §§ 12900 *et seq.*, setting forth in particularity Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Schultz and Miyamoto as set forth herein ("Schultz/Miyamoto FEH Complaint"). On March 16, 2016, Plaintiff received her right-to-sue notice from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing for the Schultz/Miyamoto FEH Complaint.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

ASSAULT

- 75. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all allegations set forth hereinabove as if set forth in full herein.
- 76. Defendant Vargas intended to cause harmful or offensive contact to Plaintiff, and placed Plaintiff in imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact.
- 77. At no time did Plaintiff consent to Defendant Vargas's intention to cause her harmful or offensive contact.
- 78. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Vargas's conduct, Plaintiff was placed in imminent apprehension of harmful and offensive contact, and as a consequence suffered severe emotional distress and other injuries to her person, in an amount to be shown according to proof.
- 79. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendant Vargas, Plaintiff sustained serious temporary and permanent injuries to her person and will suffer a loss of income and benefits, all to her damage in an amount to be shown according to proof. Plaintiff has also suffered mental anguish, physical distress and humiliation. As a result of Defendant Vargas's wrongful actions, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount within the court's general jurisdiction according to proof.
- 80. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendant Vargas, Plaintiff was compelled to and did seek medical and psychiatric services, and did incur related expenses.

 Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that she will

necessarily, by reason of her injuries, incur additional like expenses for an indefinite period of time in the future, all to Plaintiff's damage in a sum to be shown according to proof.

- 81. Defendant Vargas acted with malice, fraud and/or oppression and in conscious and reckless disregard of Plaintiff's rights with the intent to cause injury and emotional distress to Plaintiff. Defendant Vargas's conduct was outrageous and despicable and warrants the award of punitive damages pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294 in an amount sufficient to punish Defendant Vargas and make an example of him.
- 82. At all times relevant hereto and in all matters described herein, Defendant Vargas was acting within the course and scope of his employment with MSJC and as such MSJC is liable for the damages arising from Defendant Vargas's tortious conduct.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

BATTERY

- 83. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all allegations set forth hereinabove as if set forth in full herein.
- 84. Defendant Vargas made physical contact with Plaintiff with the intent to harm or offend her. Plaintiff did not consent to the contact. Plaintiff was harmed and offended by Defendant Vargas's offensive contact with her. Defendant intentionally and recklessly did acts which resulted in offensive contact with the Plaintiff's person, including but not limited to: grabbing and tightly holding Plaintiff by the arm causing serious physical and emotional injury.
- 85. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendant Vargas, Plaintiff sustained serious temporary and permanent injuries to her person and will suffer a loss of income and benefits, all to her damage in an amount to be shown according to proof. Plaintiff has also suffered mental anguish, physical distress and humiliation. As a result of Defendant Vargas's wrongful actions, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount within the court's general jurisdiction according to proof.
- 86. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendant Vargas, Plaintiff was compelled to and did seek medical and psychiatric services, and did incur related expenses.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that she will necessarily, by reason of her injuries, incur additional like expenses for an indefinite period of time in the future, all to Plaintiff's damage in a sum to be shown according to proof.

- 87. Defendant Vargas acted with malice, fraud and/or oppression and in conscious and reckless disregard of Plaintiff's rights with the intent to cause injury and emotional distress to Plaintiff.
- 88. Defendant Vargas's conduct was outrageous and despicable and warrants the award of punitive damages pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294 in an amount sufficient to punish Defendant Vargas and make an example of him.
- 89. At all times relevant hereto and in all matters described herein, Defendant Vargas was acting within the course and scope of his employment with MSJC and as such MSJC is liable for the damages arising from Defendant Vargas's tortious conduct.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

- 90. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all allegations set forth hereinabove as if set forth in full herein.
- 91. Defendant Vargas did willfully and wrongfully interfere with Plaintiff's freedom of movement and confined her against her will by violently grabbing Plaintiff by the arm and not permitting her to move for an appreciable period of time. At no time did Plaintiff consent to Defendant's actions. Nor did Defendant have a lawful reason to interfere with Plaintiff's freedom of movement.
- 92. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendant Vargas, Plaintiff sustained serious temporary and permanent injuries to her person and will suffer a loss of income and benefits, all to her damage in an amount to be shown according to proof. Plaintiff has also suffered mental anguish, physical distress and humiliation. As a result of Defendant Vargas's wrongful actions, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount within the court's general jurisdiction according to proof.

- 93. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendant Vargas, Plaintiff was compelled to and did seek medical and psychiatric services, and did incur related expenses. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that she will necessarily, by reason of her injuries, incur additional like expenses for an indefinite period of time in the future, all to Plaintiff's damage in a sum to be shown according to proof.
- 94. Defendant Vargas acted with malice, fraud and/or oppression and in conscious and reckless disregard of Plaintiff's rights with the intent to cause injury and emotional distress to Plaintiff. Defendant Vargas's conduct was outrageous and despicable and warrants the award of punitive damages pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294 in an amount sufficient to punish Defendant Vargas and make an example of him.
- 95. At all times relevant hereto and in all matters described herein, Defendant Vargas was acting within the course and scope of his employment with MSJC and as such MSJC is liable for the damages arising from Defendant Vargas's tortious conduct.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (AS TO DEFENDANTS VARGAS & MSJC)

- 96. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all allegations set forth hereinabove as if set forth in full herein.
- 97. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the tortious acts committed by Defendant Vargas and alleged herein were intentional, extreme, and outrageous. Plaintiff is further informed, and believes, and thereon alleges that such actions were done with the intent to cause serious emotional distress or with reckless disregard of the probability of causing Plaintiff serious emotional distress.
- 98. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendant Vargas, Plaintiff sustained serious temporary and permanent injuries to her person and will suffer a loss of income and benefits, all to her damage in an amount to be shown according to proof. Plaintiff has also suffered mental anguish, physical distress and humiliation. As a result of Defendant Vargas's wrongful actions, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount within the court's general jurisdiction

according to proof.

- 99. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendant Vargas, Plaintiff was compelled to and did seek medical and psychiatric services, and did incur related expenses. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that she will necessarily, by reason of her injuries, incur additional like expenses for an indefinite period of time in the future, all to Plaintiff's damage in a sum to be shown according to proof.
- 100. Defendant Vargas acted with malice, fraud and/or oppression and in conscious and reckless disregard of Plaintiff's rights with the intent to cause injury and emotional distress to Plaintiff. Defendant Vargas's conduct was outrageous and despicable and warrants the award of punitive damages pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294 in an amount sufficient to punish Defendant Vargas and make an example of him.
- 101. At all times relevant hereto and in all matters described herein, Defendant Vargas was acting within the course and scope of his employment with MSJC and as such MSJC is liable for the damages arising from Defendant Vargas's tortious conduct.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENCE

- 102. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all allegations set forth hereinabove as if set forth in full herein.
- 103. Defendant Vargas negligently, carelessly, recklessly and wantonly caused injury to Plaintiff in that among other things: Defendant Vargas grabbed Plaintiff by the arm causing serious injury to her person and emotional distress.
- 104. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendant Vargas, Plaintiff sustained serious temporary and permanent injuries to her person and will suffer a loss of income and benefits, all to her damage in an amount to be shown according to proof. Plaintiff has also suffered mental anguish, physical distress and humiliation. As a result of Defendant Vargas's wrongful actions, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount within the court's general jurisdiction according to proof.

- 105. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendant Vargas, Plaintiff was compelled to and did seek medical and psychiatric services, and did incur related expenses. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that she will necessarily, by reason of her injuries, incur additional like expenses for an indefinite period of time in the future, all to Plaintiff's damage in a sum to be shown according to proof.
- 106. At all times relevant hereto and in all matters described herein, Defendant Vargas was acting within the course and scope of his employment with MSJC and as such MSJC is liable for the damages arising from Defendant Vargas's tortious conduct.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

SEX / GENDER DISCRIMINATION

(AS TO ALL DEFENDANTS)

- 107. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all allegations set forth hereinabove as if set forth in full herein.
- 108. At all times herein mentioned, California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), California Government Code § 12940 *et seq.*, was in full force and effect and fully binding upon Defendants. Plaintiff was, and remains, a member of a group protected by the statute, in particular § 12940(a), prohibiting discrimination in employment based on sex and/or gender.
- 109. At all times herein mentioned, California Education Code §87100(b), Title 5, California Code of Regulations ("5 CCR") §§ 59300 and 59320, California Government Code § 815.6, and MSJC's Administrative Procedures prohibiting sex and/or gender discrimination were in full force and effect and binding upon Defendants. Plaintiff was, and remains, a member of a group protected by these statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures, prohibiting discrimination in employment based on sex and/or gender.
- 110. Defendant Vargas's conduct described herein constitutes discrimination based on sex and/or gender in violation of the statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures referenced hereinabove. Specifically, but not exclusively, Defendant Vargas's tortious conduct was directed toward Plaintiff as a woman and arose out of a discussion of Defendant Vargas's past history of sex/gender discrimination and harassment.

111. The	e acts and conduct of Defendants MSJC, Schultz, and Miyamoto described herein				
constitute discrimination based on sex and/or gender in violation of the statutes, regulations, and					
administrative procedures referenced hereinabove. Specifically, but not exclusively, Defendants					
MSJC, Schultz, and Miyamoto favored Defendant Vargas over Plaintiff and further biased and					
corrupted the Investigation in favor of Defendant Vargas to Plaintiff's disadvantage because					
Defendant Vargas was a man and Plaintiff was a woman.					

- 112. Further, Defendants MSJC, Schultz, and Miyamoto's actions as described herein evidence a failure to prevent Defendant Vargas' discriminatory conduct, and their actions in corrupting the Investigation and biasing its results in favor of Defendant Vargas serve to encourage such conduct now and in the future in violation of the aforementioned statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures.
- 113. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendants described herein, Plaintiff was compelled to and did seek medical and psychiatric services, and did incur related expenses. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that she will necessarily, by reason of her injuries, incur additional like expenses for an indefinite period of time in the future, all to Plaintiff's damage in a sum to be shown according to proof.
- 114. Defendants Vargas, Schultz, and Miyamoto acted with malice, fraud and/or oppression and in conscious and reckless disregard of Plaintiff's rights with the intent to cause injury and emotional distress to Plaintiff. These Defendants' conduct was outrageous and despicable and warrants the award of punitive damages pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294 in an amount sufficient to punish and make an example of them.
- 115. At all times relevant hereto and in all matters described herein, Defendants Vargas, Schultz, and Miyamoto were acting within the course and scope of their employment with MSJC and as such MSJC is liable for the damages arising from their wrongful conduct.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

(AS TO ALL DEFENDANTS)

116. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all allegations set forth hereinabove as if set

117. At all times herein mentioned, California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), California Government Code § 12940 *et seq.*, was in full force and effect and fully binding upon Defendants. Plaintiff was, and remains, a member of a group protected by the statute, in particular § 12940(a), prohibiting sexual harassment in employment.

- 118. At all times herein mentioned, California Education Code §87100(b), Title 5, California Code of Regulations ("5 CCR") §§ 59300 and 59320, California Government Code § 815.6, and MSJC's Administrative Procedures prohibiting sexual harassment were in full force and effect and binding upon Defendants. Plaintiff was, and remains, a member of a group protected by these statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures, prohibiting sexual harassment in employment.
- 119. Defendant Vargas's conduct described herein constitutes sexual harassment in violation of the statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures referenced hereinabove.

 Specifically, but not exclusively, Defendant Vargas's tortious conduct was directed toward Plaintiff as a woman and arose out of a discussion of Defendant Vargas's past history of sex/gender discrimination and harassment.
- 120. The acts and conduct of Defendants MSJC, Schultz, and Miyamoto described herein constitute sexual harassment in violation of the statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures referenced hereinabove. Specifically, but not exclusively, Defendants MSJC, Schultz, and Miyamoto favored Defendant Vargas over Plaintiff and further biased and corrupted the Investigation in favor of Defendant Vargas to Plaintiff's disadvantage because Defendant Vargas was a man and Plaintiff was a woman.
- 121. Further, Defendants MSJC, Schultz, and Miyamoto's actions as described herein evidence a failure to prevent Defendant Vargas' unlawful conduct, and their actions in corrupting the Investigation and biasing its results in favor of Defendant Vargas serve to encourage such conduct now and in the future in violation of the aforementioned statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures, and in particular California Government Code § 12940(k).
 - 122. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendants described herein,

Plaintiff was compelled to and did seek medical and psychiatric services, and did incur related expenses. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that she will necessarily, by reason of her injuries, incur additional like expenses for an indefinite period of time in the future, all to Plaintiff's damage in a sum to be shown according to proof.

- 123. Defendants Vargas, Schultz, and Miyamoto acted with malice, fraud and/or oppression and in conscious and reckless disregard of Plaintiff's rights with the intent to cause injury and emotional distress to Plaintiff. These Defendants' conduct was outrageous and despicable and warrants the award of punitive damages pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294 in an amount sufficient to punish and make an example of them.
- 124. At all times relevant hereto and in all matters described herein, Defendants Vargas, Schultz, and Miyamoto were acting within the course and scope of their employment with MSJC and as such MSJC is liable for the damages arising from their wrongful conduct.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

RETALIATION

(AS TO DEFENDANTS MSJC, SCHULTZ, AND MIYAMOTO)

- 125. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all allegations set forth hereinabove as if set forth in full herein.
- 126. At all times herein mentioned, California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), California Government Code § 12940 *et seq.*, was in full force and effect and fully binding upon Defendants. Plaintiff was, and remains, a member of a group protected by the statute, in particular § 12940(h), prohibiting retaliation.
- 127. At all times herein mentioned, California's Labor Code § 6310 was in full force and effect and fully binding upon Defendants. Plaintiff was, and remains, a member of a group protected by the statutes prohibiting retaliation.
- 128. At all times herein mentioned, California Education Code §87100(b), Title 5, California Code of Regulations ("5 CCR") §§ 59300 and 59320, California Government Code § 815.6, and MSJC's Administrative Procedures prohibiting retaliation were in full force and effect and binding upon Defendants. Plaintiff was, and remains, a member of a group protected by these

statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures, prohibiting retaliation.

- 129. The acts and conduct of Defendants MSJC, Schultz, and Miyamoto described herein constitute retaliation in violation of the statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures referenced hereinabove. Specifically, but not exclusively, Defendants MSJC, Schultz, and Miyamoto favored Defendant Vargas over Plaintiff and further biased and corrupted the Investigation in favor of Defendant Vargas to Plaintiff's disadvantage because Plaintiff sought enforce her rights to be free from assault, age/gender discrimination, and sexual harassment and to otherwise engage in protected behavior.
- 130. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendants described herein, Plaintiff was compelled to and did seek medical and psychiatric services, and did incur related expenses. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that she will necessarily, by reason of her injuries, incur additional like expenses for an indefinite period of time in the future, all to Plaintiff's damage in a sum to be shown according to proof.
- 131. Defendants Schultz, and Miyamoto acted with malice, fraud and/or oppression and in conscious and reckless disregard of Plaintiff's rights with the intent to cause injury and emotional distress to Plaintiff. These Defendants' conduct was outrageous and despicable and warrants the award of punitive damages pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294 in an amount sufficient to punish and make an example of them.
- 132. At all times relevant hereto and in all matters described herein, Defendants Schultz and Miyamoto were acting within the course and scope of their employment with MSJC and as such MSJC is liable for the damages arising from their wrongful conduct.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

(AS TO DEFENDANTS MSJC, SCHULTZ, AND MIYAMOTO)

- 133. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all allegations set forth hereinabove as if set forth in full herein.
- 134. MSJC's Administrative Procedures serve as an agreement between MSJC and Plaintiff regarding the procedures required of a complainant on the one hand, and on the other hand,

of MSJC as the investigatory and enforcement body for the matters set forth therein.

- 135. At all times herein mentioned, MSJC's Administrative Procedures expressly required Plaintiff as the complainant to repose her trust in MSJC to conduct an impartial, unbiased, and confidential Investigation into the Administrative Complaints.
- 136. At all times herein mentioned, MSJC's Administrative Procedures expressly required MSJC to conduct the Investigation confidentially and knowing that Plaintiff was expressly required to repose her trust in the integrity of MSJC's Investigation.
- 137. MSJC entered into its relationship and conducted the Investigation knowing the fiduciary-level duties it owed to Plaintiff in the context of the Investigation.
- 138. The acts and conduct of Defendants MSJC, Schultz, and Miyamoto described herein constitute a breach of the fiduciary duties MSJC owed to Plaintiff.
- 139. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the actions of Defendants described herein, Plaintiff was compelled to and did seek medical and psychiatric services, and did incur related expenses. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that she will necessarily, by reason of her injuries, incur additional like expenses for an indefinite period of time in the future, all to Plaintiff's damage in a sum to be shown according to proof.
- 140. Defendants Schultz, and Miyamoto acted with malice, fraud and/or oppression and in conscious and reckless disregard of Plaintiff's rights with the intent to cause injury and emotional distress to Plaintiff. These Defendants' conduct was outrageous and despicable and warrants the award of punitive damages pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294 in an amount sufficient to punish and make an example of them.
- 141. At all times relevant hereto and in all matters described herein, Defendants Schultz and Miyamoto were acting within the course and scope of their employment with MSJC and as such MSJC is liable for the damages arising from their wrongful conduct.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as follows:

- (1) For general, compensatory, and special damages in an amount subject to proof at trial;
- (2) For sums incurred and to be incurred for medical and mental health professional

1		services;
2	(3)	For punitive and exemplary damages in the amount of \$7,000,000;
3	(4)	For interest provided by law including, but not limited to, California Civil Code §
4		3291;
5	(5)	For costs of suit herein incurred;
6	(6)	For attorneys' fees pursuant to statute; and
7	(7)	For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.
8	D . 1 . 1	1.20.2016
9	Dated: Marc	h 30, 2016
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12		David Yerushalmi, Esq. American Freedom Law Center
13		Attorneys for Plaintiff DENISE DALAIMO NUSSBAUM
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