[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IRANIAN BACKED MILITIAS: DESTABILIZING THE MIDDLE EAST
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 4, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-64
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Michael Knights, Ph.D., Lafer Fellow, The Washington Institute
for Near East Policy........................................... 8
Mr. Aram Nerguizian, senior associate, Burke Chair in Strategy,
Center for Strategic and International Studies................. 21
Kenneth Pollack, Ph.D., resident scholar, American Enterprise
Institute...................................................... 53
Ms. Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and deputy director,
International Security Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies.......................................... 69
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement................ 4
Michael Knights, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 10
Mr. Aram Nerguizian: Prepared statement.......................... 23
Kenneth Pollack, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 55
Ms. Melissa Dalton: Prepared statement........................... 71
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 96
Hearing minutes.................................................. 97
The Honorable Ted Poe: Material submitted for the record......... 98
IRANIAN BACKED MILITIAS: DESTABILIZING THE MIDDLE EAST
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record
subject to the length limitation in the rules of the committee.
I will make my opening statement at this time.
The Middle East continues to pose some of the biggest
challenges to United States national security. Where there is a
threat to our interests in the region we can be sure that Iran
and its proxy forces and militias are somewhere in the
neighborhood.
From Yemen to Afghanistan, Iranian arms can be found in the
hands of some of the most dangerous actors. This is part of a
calculated strategy by the mullahs in Tehran to assert control
over the entire region by expelling the United States.
The Iranians believe they are entitled to dominance over
anybody else in the region. They provide weapons and support to
sectarian individuals who commit atrocities and undermine
legitimate government institutions.
In Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, and the
Palestinian territories, Iran backs violent actors who either
rule through brutality or aspire to seize power by eliminating
political opposition.
Many of these groups have been household names for years.
Hezbollah in Lebanon is the most prominent one. Nurtured by
Tehran since the 1980s, Hezbollah has grown from a band of
insurgents who perpetrated the 1983 Beirut Marine Corps
barracks bombing to a well-armed and funded terrorist state-
within-a-state that does Iran's bidding around the globe.
Its clever use of propaganda, civil service, and political
participation have made Hezbollah the dominant force in
Lebanon. Its power in the country undermines United States'
relationship with Beirut and poses a significant threat to our
friends in Israel.
Increasingly, we see Hezbollah operatives going beyond
Lebanon and carrying out the will of its Iranian masters
everywhere. From training rebels in Yemen to directly
contributing to the slaughter in Syria and preserving Assad's
oppressive regime.
Now Iran has multiple ``Hezbollahs'' it can call on to kill
and coerce throughout the region. Funded by sanctions relief
granted to Iran under the JCPOA and enabled by America's
retreat over the past 8 years, Iranian-backed groups are
seizing territory, cajoling governments, and hindering our
effort to defeat ISIS and al-Qaeda.
Our troops and Foreign Service officers and intelligence
personnel who are trying to help Iraqis, Syrians, and Kurds
fight ISIS have been repeatedly threatened by Iran's many
opportunities in Iraq and Syria.
In May, United States air strikes stopped an Iranian-backed
militia that was advancing toward our troops in Syria. A month
later, U.S. aircraft shot down two Iranian-made drones that
tried to attack coalition forces.
It is important to remember why bloodshed in this part of
the world continues to endure. It was Tehran's sectarian
influence that poisoned the fledgling democracy in Iraq and
propped up the Assad regime in Syria.
Because of this, Sunni extremists like al-Qaeda and ISIS
that the U.S. had defeated are able to recruit among alienated
communities and thrive.
In the chaos, Iran moves further. While we provide security
assistance to governments to restore order, they forge new
outlaw groups modeled after Hezbollah.
Iran's strategy is partly due to the weakness of its
outdated military. In Syria, Iran has turned to recruiting from
vulnerable communities to fight the war.
A report this week from Human Rights Watch shows that Iran
is recruiting child soldiers from Afghanistan to help save the
Assad regime in Syria.
By using foreign forces, Iran creates a grey zone where it
can challenge rivals but deny its direct involvement. Using
Hezbollah in Lebanon, it can wage war on Israel while never
suffering retaliation.
In Yemen, the allies can fire missiles at U.S. warships--
its allies can fire missiles at U.S. warships and our Gulf
partners with impunity.
Tehran's ability to expand its power throughout the region
and become a threat to us and our allies has gone on too long.
I applaud the recent legislation that cleared the Foreign
Affairs Committee that targets Hezbollah. But more must be
done.
Opposition to dangerous Iranian expansionism and support
for terrorism is a bipartisan concern. Congress can lead
further by developing a strategy to counter all of Iran's
proxies.
There is more at stake than just surrendering the region to
Iran. If we want to defeat ISIS and defend allies like Israel,
we must stop the growth of Iranian-backed groups and their
destabilizing behavior.
Iran's mobs have gone unchallenged. We are here today to
find out from our four experts what the U.S. policy is toward
all of this chaos and what it should be doing in the future.
And I will now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Keating, for
my--I started to say Alabama but sorry--Massachusetts for his
opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Poe follows:]
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----------
Mr. Keating. A little difference in the two states, I
think.
Mr. Poe. A little bit.
Mr. Keating. That's all right. We are all one country.
Mr. Chairman, thank you and I apologize. I am going to be,
at a certain point soon, going out for rollcalls within another
one of my committees.
But I would like to thank you for holding this important
hearing and talking about this important issue. Let's recall
that prior to concluding negotiations with Iran around the
nuclear deal, Iran could have just--actually was, without
question, just months away from a nuclear weapon.
Just 5 years ago, the airwaves were dominated by concerns
over whether we'd be facing a nuclear Iran. Today, we are
debating next steps with the deal and we are making sure to
conduct robust oversight of Iran's compliance.
What was once a major national security crisis is now also
a problem that we can work with our problems and allies to
solve.
That's why making our country safer is important and it's
deals like this that make it look like that's a way that can
yield progress--dealing with the reality of the threats we
face, working hand in hand with our allies, and doing something
about it.
Iran's destabilizing actions in foreign policy are indeed a
serious and deeply troubling event because they threaten to
undermine the security and stability of the region, not to
mention the right of the people in those countries to establish
legitimate effective governments and work toward safe and
productive lives for themselves in their communities.
The United States should continue to be a global leader in
promoting peace, the rule of law, and security for all. We must
be meaningfully involved in addressing Iran's support for proxy
groups, and violent nonstate actors.
There is a threat in front of us. So we must be clear-eyed
about what it means to take that threat on and then pursue the
most informed effective strategies we can to eliminate it.
The leadership of the State Department was pivotal in
countering the nuclear threat from Iran and they will continue
to be critical in addressing Iran's malign influence in the
Middle East and around the world.
We have also cultivated deep partnerships with our many
allies in Europe, the Middle East, and around the world. We
can't forget that the nuclear deal was a product of global
cooperation at the United Nations and among our closest allies.
Undermining Iran's destabilizing activities around the
world is a global problem and it is unrealistic of us to assume
that we could somehow take this one on by ourselves when every
other threat of this nature has demanded consistent unwavering
cooperation and collaboration with our friends and allies who
share our vision for a more peaceful world.
Iran continues to threaten the security of the region
through proxies and other destabilizing activities including in
countries where the United States is actively working to
promote security and establish a baseline of stability in Iraq,
Yemen, Syria.
Countering Iran's influence, however, is not just about
countering Iran. Russian support for the Assad regime in Syria,
for example, has strengthened Iran by sharing its burden in
Syria and strengthening Iran's ability to continue funding its
engagement abroad.
These proxy groups are not also wholly-owned entities of
Iran. They are often independent groups that have been
considered as threats on their own as well as in relation to
their ties with Iran.
We have learned through decades of conflict that
eliminating threats to security is not easy. Iran has been able
to take advantage of instability and conflict and weak rule of
law in order to gain influence beyond its borders through
violence and undermining legitimate sovereign institutions.
We cannot unilaterally change Iran's behaviors. However, we
can indeed and should influence the context in which Iran
operates illegally.
We do have the ability to act upon these issues with other
sanctions that we can impose outside of this agreement.
We must also advance a robust U.S. State Department with an
adequate budget, by filling leadership positions across the
State Department, by strengthening ties with our allies, not
calling them into question, and by truly working to understand
the complexities of the security and geopolitical challenges in
the entire region.
That's why I appreciate the witnesses being here today to
testify on this issue, to offer your insights and
recommendations on how we can wrestle with the unfortunate
realities we are working with on the ground but also testify to
the resources we have available to us to eliminate the threat
posed by Iran's actions throughout the Middle East and the
world.
Thank you all. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements will
be made part of this record. I would ask that the witnesses
keep your presentation to no more than 5 minutes.
When you see the red light come on on that little thing in
front of you, stop, or I'll encourage you to stop.
So we have your statements and all the committee members
have that. I will introduce our witnesses and then give them
time for their opening statements. After the statements, then
the members of the subcommittee will ask you questions.
I do want to thank you for changing your schedule today to
be here this afternoon. I know you were supposed to be here
earlier, and you were. Thanks for waiting. I don't know what
you did during that interim but thank you for being here.
Dr. Michael Knights is a Lafer Fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East policy. Previously, he worked on
capacity-building projects in Iraq, Yemen, and has published
numerous works on the challenges of containing Iranian
influence.
Mr. Aram Nerguizian is the senior associate and Burke Chair
in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. He is frequently consulted by government and private
sectors and has authored a number of books on the Middle East.
Dr. Kenneth Pollack is a resident scholar at American
Enterprise Institute. Prior to this, Dr. Pollack was affiliated
with the Brookings Institute and served on the National
Security Council.
And Ms. Melissa Dalton is a senior fellow and deputy
director of the International Security Program at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies.
Previously, she served in a number of positions at the
United States Department of Defense in the office of Under
Secretary of Defense for policy.
Dr. Knights, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KNIGHTS, PH.D., LAFER FELLOW, THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Knights. Thank you. Thanks very much.
Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and the distinguished
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at today's
hearing on Iranian-backed militias.
I am very proud to be giving testimony today to the House
for the first time as a new American citizen, as an immigrant,
and as an adopted son of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
We are here today because Iran and, particularly, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps--IRGC--is hesitant to risk
its own people in its expansion across the region but it's
quite happy to fight to the last Arab or to fight to the last
Afghan to win these regional wars.
Iranian-backed militias give Iran the ability to threaten
Israel in the Golan Heights, to fire ballistic missiles into
Saudi Arabia as far as Riyadh, to threaten Abu Dhabi with
ballistic missile attack or to intimidate vital sea lanes
without facing the direct consequences of taking such steps.
So reducing the scale of Iranian-backed militias will be a
critical part of a new strategy to counter Iranian influence
and I'd like to suggest six areas where we might move forward,
and in the written testimony there is a lot of detailing on
Iranian militia--backed militia activities in Iraq, in Yemen,
in Bahrain, and in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
So, first, we need to compete with Iran in key spaces. Iran
always fills a vacuum. It's very opportunistic.
The United States should openly adopt a strategic game of
diminishing malign Iranian influence in any and all spaces
where Iran could seek to expand.
This means publicly committing to the reduction of malign
Iranian influence in a range of areas. For instance, there must
be no significant Lebanese, Hezbollah, or Iraqi militia or
Iranian forces in southern Syria adjacent to Israel, or along,
let's say, the Iraq-Syria border. There must be no significant
Lebanese, Hezbollah, or Iranian forces in Yemen.
Perfect success is less important than sending the right
signal to regional allies than to the Iranian regime.
Second, we need to build and repair alliances. We need to
back allies in effective states like the counterterrorism
service in Iraq or the rebels in southern Syria. We need to fix
rifts within the Gulf Cooperation Council, weave Iraq back into
the Arab world, particularly its relationship with Saudi
Arabia, and show Europe that the U.S. will not leave the
nuclear accord before exhausting all other alternatives. The
more we give, the more we will get.
Three, we need to divide Iran from potential proxies, not
push them together. Iran's interest is rarely perfectly aligned
with its proxies. But the proxies are often desperate for
assistance and Iran is the only one making a credible offer.
By being present and active in the Middle East, the U.S.
can work with allies to slowly drive a wedge between Iran and
potential proxies while offering them better options.
For instance, in Iraq, we should quietly support a gradual
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program that
reduces the threat posed by Iranian-backed militias operating
within Iraq's well-funded popular mobilization forces.
In Yemen, the best way to peel the Houthis away from Iran
is to push Saudi Arabia to reduce civilian casualties in the
war and drive for a rapid peace process that will end the war
with a sustainable decentralization-based solution.
In the Gulf States, we need to push Saudi Arabia and other
Gulf States to improve the political and religious freedom to
protections of Shi'a minorities, which is the best way to split
these potential proxies away from Iran instead of pushing them
toward Iran.
Likewise, we need to interdict Iranian lines of
communication. Much has been made of the so-called land bridge
between Iran and Syria via Iraq, importantly. It is worth
remembering that Iraq is the bridge so Iraq should remain to be
very important for our policy, going forward.
But it is--it's worth remembering that Iranian sponsorship
of Lebanese Hezbollah including its large missile force was
achieved without a land bridge.
The U.S. needs to work to interdict land, air, and sea
communications as well as financial and electronic between
Iraq--between Iran and its proxies.
We should help places like Iraq to stem the flow of
fighters out toward these places.
We also need to impose and exercise painful red lines on
Iran and we need to demonstrate this credibility. We need to
build credibility by always following through on our threats,
even when they might be painful, even when they might open us
up to the prospect of Iranian retaliation against our citizens
abroad.
And finally, we should put somebody in charge of
coordinating and rolling back Iranian-backed militias. On their
side, they have Qasem Soleimani as the figure who owns this--
the portfolio of building Shi'a militias and guiding that
process.
We might ask, who is Qasem Soleimani. We need somebody who
can bring together and employ all their tools of national
power.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Knights follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Knights.
We will now proceed to our next witness, Mr. Nerguizian. I
apologize. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF MR. ARAM NERGUIZIAN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, BURKE CHAIR
IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Nerguizian. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Lebanon and
the challenges it faces in the wake of Hezbollah's military
intervention in Syria and the Lebanese Armed Forces' August
campaign against ISIS.
Hezbollah's decision to commit to offensive military
operations inside Syria in concert with Assad's forces in a
pre-emptive war----
Mr. Poe. Is your microphone on?
Mr. Nerguizian. It is, sir.
Mr. Poe. Move it closer, please, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Nerguizian. Better?
Mr. Poe. Better.
Mr. Nerguizian. Hezbollah's decision to commit to offensive
military operations inside Syria in concert with Assad's forces
in a preemptive war of choice reflects its own narrow set of
overlapping regional and domestic priorities, preserving the
resistance axis with Iran and Assad's Syria, the perceived need
to contain militant Lebanese Sunni forces, and dealing with the
communal fears of Lebanon's Shi'a community.
As a regional minority group, all serve as continued
justification for Hezbollah to maintain strategic depth in
Syria.
In 2017, Hezbollah's military priorities in Syria have
shifted from an active combat role in and around Zabadani and
the Qalamun mountain range to supporting a more expeditionary
posture backing Assad and allied forces.
The 2011 to 2017 period has been a daunting challenge for
Lebanon. Even Hezbollah has strained to simultaneously maintain
its posture in south Lebanon, create metrics of stability in
the north and the Bequaa and sustain a forward expeditionary
footing in Syria.
In the face of these regional challenges, no national
institution in Lebanon has contributed more to relative
stability than the Lebanese Armed Forces, United States'
principal institutional partner in the country.
Today, the LAF stands as a paradox. In a country with a
clientelist sectarian system that abhors professional
institutions, the LAF has emerged as one of the Arabic-speaking
Middle East's only fighting militaries and one of the United
States military's most effective regional counterterrorism
partners.
With the clear and insulated theater-level chain of command
in place, the LAF began the execution of its counter ISIS
campaign against militants on the Lebanese side of the Syrian-
Lebanese frontier and operation code name Dawn of the Jurds,
loosely translated, was publicly announced on August 19, 2017.
Later that day, Hezbollah and the Syrian Arab army
announced their own counter ISIS military campaign on the--on
their side of the Syrian frontier.
For all the international concern of potential LAF
Hezbollah coordination, the official start date of the
operation is misleading. Well before August 19th, the LAF had
already begun taking independent action against ISIS--ISIS
ridge lines and positions.
The initial brunt of the operation was executed on August
14th. The LAF's superior battlefield awareness and targeted
strike capability quickly demoralized ISIS forces in Lebanon.
As LAF regular and elite units took more ground and
consolidated their new positions, the effective use of U.S.-
supplied ISR targeted strike SOF and armoured mobility led to
the description of Dawn of the Jurds by one U.S. military
officer in Lebanon to me as 21st century manoeuver warfare by a
modern military.
As the LAF prepared to free the last remaining pocket of
territory held by ISIS, Hezbollah publicly announced that it
was engaging in controversial negotiations with ISIS to secure
the whereabouts of LAF military personnel captured by ISIS and
Jabhat al-Nusra militants in August 2014.
This, in turn, forced a temporary resuspension of LAF
military operations and on August 29th, 2017, in a deal
brokered by Hezbollah, ISIS forces began preparations to depart
Lebanon.
After Dawn of the Jurds, LAF commanders and their U.S. and
U.K. counterparts are comfortable stating that the campaign was
conducted with no coordination or cooperation between the LAF
and Hezbollah.
On the contrary, the LAF's solo campaign was so successful
that elements close to Hezbollah sought to take credit
retroactively for the LAF's successes and/or promote a
narrative of secret coordination between the LAF, Hezbollah,
and the Assad regime.
Dawn of the Jurds may have lasting implications for a
stalled debate in Lebanon and national security. The LAF's
rapid and professional execution of the counter ISIS campaign
without anyone's help, including Hezbollah or the Assad regime,
has shattered the narrative in the minds of some Lebanese that
Hezbollah is Lebanon's sole preeminent national security actor.
Those who define Lebanon through the lens of Iran alone
would fail to see the LAF as anything but an extension of
Hezbollah.
However, as one senior Pentagon official noted to me, there
are still many in the U.S. Government and Congress who believe
that there is still a Lebanon and LAF worth saving. Being
hawkish on Lebanon in U.S. policy terms has traditionally meant
being tough on Hezbollah and other opponents of U.S. policy in
the Middle East.
But when the LAF engaged ISIS militarily in August, being
hawkish on Lebanon meant doubling down on the LAF because, in
the end, a Lebanon with a weak LAF will be fertile terrain for
Iran and its local and regional partners.
Choosing not to blink in the face of Lebanon's complexity
and standing fast by the LAF as U.S. civilian and military
leaders did this August only serves to strengthen the LAF's
domestic and international military legitimacy.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nerguizian follows:]
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----------
Mr. Poe. Dr. Pollack.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH POLLACK, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Pollack. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
Member, distinguished members of the committee. It is a great
privilege to be here before you.
This topic that you've raised of Iranian support to
militant groups across the region and the role that they play
in Iran's regional policy is an extremely important one and I
just want to make three overarching points on this.
First, in the military realm, there is nothing special,
nothing magical about Iran's willingness or desire to support
these groups, how it has done so, or the success that it has
enjoyed in doing so.
Iran backs these groups because it is politically and
strategically constrained from using its own forces to project
power.
The support it provides is entirely conventional and not
meaningfully different from the kinds of support that the
United States has provided to countless groups during our
history, ranging from UNITA to the Afghan mujahadeen to the
current Syrian democratic forces.
What's more, the militant groups that Iran has helped to
sponsor and back are not terribly capable. They are mostly
extremely mediocre forces.
Their successes, to the extent that they have enjoyed them,
are largely attributable to very conventional sources and are
not exceptional in any way.
Even Hezbollah has proven itself relatively far more
capable than other Arab militaries. But it is not the match for
any modern capable military. It is not a match for the United
States military, for the Israeli Defense Forces, or any other
in that category.
Ultimately, there is nothing that the Iranians or Hezbollah
has to teach in the military realm to the United States Armed
Forces or to the CIA.
Second, where they do have something to teach it is in the
political, economic, and social support that are core elements
of what we call their Hezbollah model.
There, what the Iranians have hit upon is that the
political, economic, and social services that they use to build
up these forces, to root them in their communities are critical
to the success of these groups.
They provide them with a great deal of popular support and
legitimacy, which, in turn, translates to cover and
concealment, greater intelligence, better ability to recruit
and to secure financial resources and, ultimately, as we see in
the case of Lebanon, political power, all of which advance
their aims in these critical but ultimately nonmilitary spheres
that nevertheless impinge upon the military and upon the
battlefield.
It should remind us that we cannot prevail against Iran nor
can we stabilize the Middle East or help the countries of the
region to do so by military means alone.
Third, and along similar lines, Iran is not 10 feet tall.
They are not fools. They are quite capable. But at the end of
the day, Iran is not the source of the problems of the Middle
East.
Iran simply exacerbates those problems and exploits them.
Ultimately, the best way to prevent Iran from making further
gains in the Middle East is to address the underlying economic,
political, and social problems which are roiling the entire
region, which are creating weak governments, failed states,
civil wars, and insurgencies.
That is what Iran goes looking for, and we find that time
and time again when the fissures in Middle Eastern societies
create opportunities, the Iranians are Johnny-on-the-spot to
take advantage of them, and they use their support and they use
every means that they can to try to pry those states apart.
And, ultimately, if our goal is to prevent the Iranians
from expanding their influence, from building up their support,
from recruiting new members of this coalition that they have
tried to craft all across the region, ultimately to overturn
the regional status quo and to remake it in their own
interests, the most important thing that the United States can
do is to help the countries of the region to address these
underlying problems.
It is absolutely critical that we do so. We are not going
to be able to fight the Iranians piece by piece, matching them
on the battlefield time and again. They are not going to stop.
They are infinitely patient and they will keep coming back.
But what we have seen from our own hard experience is that
when we help the people of the region to address their problems
in governance, economics, and social issues, they will push
back on the Iranians more effectively than we ever could.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pollack follows:]
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----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Dr. Pollack.
Ms. Dalton.
STATEMENT OF MS. MELISSA DALTON, SENIOR FELLOW AND DEPUTY
DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Dalton. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to
testify before you today on the challenge of Iranian-backed
militias alongside my excellent colleagues.
Several goals drive Iran's approach to the region including
ensuring survival of the Islamic Republic, deterring
adversaries, enhancing its regional power and influence, and
securing a place of political and economic importance within
the international community.
Iran is aware of its conventional military inferiority that
Ken just described versus its adversaries. It views its
strategy as a type of self-reliant deterrence against
adversaries bent on keeping it weak.
It leverages a range of unconventional and conventional
capabilities in concepts of operation including proxy forces to
achieve its objectives.
This approach also encompasses other activities including
missile development, engaging in provocative maritime
operations, exploiting cyber vulnerabilities, and employing
information operations.
It ensures that any escalations against the United States
and its regional partners fall short of large-scale warfare
where we have the advantage.
Through this approach, Iran can pursue its goals while
avoiding kinetic consequences, enjoy plausible deniability
while using its proxies, subvert regional rivals and deter them
from taking actions that could trigger a potential backlash
from the proxy groups, and infiltrate and influence state
institutions incrementally in countries with weak governance.
Moreover, the wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have provided
fertile ground for the growth of Iranian proxies and supported
groups. They also have broader implications. Russia has
reemerged as a regional player following its Syrian
intervention allied with Iran in support of Bashar al-Assad,
raising the geopolitical stakes for the United States and Syria
and possibly the greater region.
Israel may take greater unilateral and proactive steps in
Syria to protect its security. Iran's support for Houthi rebels
in Yemen provoked a Saudi-led intervention, embroiling a U.S.
partner in a controversial and protracted war.
Iran's approach also presents vulnerabilities. Through its
destabilizing regional activities, Iran's image as an
international pariah remains in many ways the same, impairing
its economic development.
Iran is also hindered by a principal agent problem versus
its proxies, which do not always act in accordance with Iranian
interests.
Not all proxies are created equal. Some receive more
support from Iran and are ideologically closer to Iran than
others, such as differences between Lebanese Hezbollah and some
Iraqi Shi'ite groups.
Yet, the United States has largely been unable to deter
Iran's incremental extension of regional power and threshold
testing across a range of military and paramilitary activities.
Indeed, in the last 5 years, Iran's threat network has
grown. Policy makers face a dilemma when it comes to Iran. If
Iran's hostile actions elicit conciliatory responses, Iran can
deem its actions as successful. It's coercive in shaping
strategy is working.
But if Iran's hostile actions elicit punitive responses,
Iran can feel even greater incentive to act asymmetrically
where its strengths are.
Thus, a sequence combination of both sticks and carrots and
leveraging a range of nonmilitary and military tools ourselves
is the best way to disrupt this cycle.
Iran is not a unitary actor. A punishment or incentive for
some factions in Iran may be perceived differently by others.
Good intelligence, negotiations and track two dialogues can
illuminate these nuances and be pursued in parallel with a
sharpened strategy to address Iran's destabilizing behavior.
Working in coordination with allies and partners, the
United States can take several steps to limit the reach and
growth of Iranian proxy activities.
These measures include ratcheting up direct and indirect
operations to disrupt IRGC activity and interdict support for
proxies calibrated for U.S. and Iranian red lines; conduct
cyber disruption of proxy activities; avoid inflating Iranian
capabilities and intentions; expose Iranian-backed groups,
front companies, and financial activities outside its borders
to discourage Iranian coercive interference; exploit
nationalist sentiment in the region that bristles at Iranian
interference through amplified information operations; sustain
financial pressure on IRGC and proxy activities; negotiate an
end to the Syrian and Yemenese civil wars that minimizes the
presence of foreign forces; constrict the space that the IRGC
can exploit in the region by building the capabilities of
regional partner security forces, and supporting governance and
resiliency initiatives in countries vulnerable to Iranian
penetration.
Even a U.S. strategy that seeks to amplify pressure on Iran
cannot be purely punitive or it will prove escalatory and have
its limits in changing Iran's behavior.
The United States should link possible incentives to
changes that Iran makes first such that they are synchronized
as one move.
Congress and the U.S. administration have an opportunity to
chart a pathway forward on Iran policy. I hope that today's
hearing can inform that process.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton follows:]
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----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ms. Dalton. The Chair will reserve its
time until later and allow members to ask questions.
At this time, also for the record, without objection, the
map that you have in front of you that's on the board that
shows Iran and then the countries that we have mentioned where
their proxies are will be made part of the record.
The Chair will recognize the gentleman from California,
Colonel Cook, for his opening--or his questions.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Dr. Knights, I want to talk to you about Soleimani, and I
know you referred to him and everything else but--and I think
you described him as--he's kind of a multiple threat player and
the reports that I've read and the conversations about
Soleimani being all over, just how much power does he have in
this government?
It almost seems like he's almost unchecked. He goes to meet
with Putin in Moscow. He meets with certain groups that we have
described as terrorists. It just seems like he has got
tremendous power and influence in that country, and if you
could elaborate on that I would appreciate that.
Mr. Knights. Thanks very much.
There are other people who can add to what I will say. But
he's--Soleimani is a powerful propaganda figure. He's become a
symbol of Iran's expansion in the region. He's a dedicated
soldier who seems to want to stay out of politics. He's trusted
by the senior leadership within Iran including the Supreme
Leader.
He has relationships with individuals across all of the
affected countries where Iran is expanding its influence and
he's a capable tactician.
But, as Ken said, he's not 10 feet tall. He has faced
setbacks, most recently, for instance, when he tried to stop
the Iraqi Kurds from holding their referendum and they resisted
his power.
So even when he's trying very hard, regional states can
still resist as long as they--or at least a number of regional
states can resist, especially if they have U.S. backing. His
power is not endless.
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
I want to switch gears a little bit.
Dr. Pollack, you talked about Hezbollah or however you want
to pronounce it, and it almost made it seem like they are--I
think they are still a formidable military force. And I think
that some of my colleagues in Israel would attest to that were
they to change their strategy, particularly their engagements
in '06, particularly the damage that was done to their Thanks
and APCs and everything like that.
And I still think they are very, very powerful. They
adjusted. They did very well from a military standpoint. I'm
not addressing the economic and social aspects of it.
But and maybe my--being on the House Armed Services
Committee I get a different take on it. I still think they're a
very powerful factor variable in Lebanon and on the northern
border of Israel and Syria.
Does anyone have anything to contribute to that or--I know
it's kind of slanting more military but I--I still think they
are still a terrorist organization and they've gotten more and
more equipment including the Russian Kornet anti-tank missiles,
which have proven very, very effective. And the same thing has
been used against the Saudis in Yemen.
Mr. Pollack. Congressman, I will be the first to answer
that. First, I want to be specific--the point that I was trying
to make in my opening remarks was that Hezbollah is not
something extraordinary or exceptional. We shouldn't see them
as some kind of a magical force that has capabilities that we
can't match in any way, shape, or form.
Second point--I would certainly agree with you, and I
believe I at least made this point briefly in my opening
remarks, that Hezbollah is exceptional within the Arab world.
They are far superior to any current Arab military in terms of
their unit by unit capability.
I mean, if you simply look at their combat performance I
think it's a fair assessment that they are probably the most
able Arab military that we have seen since the Jordanians in
1948.
Now, that's an important point, and on the battlefield in
particular in Syria, what we have seen is that Hezbollah units
have functioned very well, better than most.
Mr. Cook. They're going to cut me off here pretty soon. But
I did want to--I noticed that one thing was not covered and
that's the difference between the Shi'ites and the Sunni, which
is a, obviously, a big problem with Saudi Arabia and,
obviously, Arabs versus Persian, and that big difference
there--how much do you think that contributes to some of these
difficulties that we have? And I'm out of time so----
Mr. Pollack. I'll pick up again.
I think there is no question that the Sunni-Shi'a split is
out there and it's something that the Iranians have been able
to exploit to a certain extent.
We should recognize that in many ways it's also a
disadvantage for them, something they're acutely aware of,
because the Muslim world is overwhelmingly Sunni, not Shi'a,
and the Iranians have in the past tried as much as they could
to support Sunni groups and other non-Shi'a groups. It's just
that they mostly get purchase with the Shi'a groups.
The last point, as you point out, there is--you know, there
are good ways to counter this and one of them is the Arab-
Persian split that you mentioned, and we've seen time and
again, especially in Iraq, is that Iraqi Shi'a, when given the
opportunity, identify themselves as Arabs before Shi'a. They
need that opportunity.
Mr. Cook. Good point. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from California.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms.
Frankel.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for
this hearing.
Let's see, I have four questions. See if you can remember
that. I might have five but I don't know if I will get past
four.
My first question is, there has been some talk by some in
the administration of the United States pulling out of the
JCPOA. I would like your opinion of that.
I would like to hear your opinion of how the proposed
reduction--one-third reduction in the State Department budget
and especially USAID, how you think that affects the discussion
that we are having here today.
And relative to that, one of you talked about how Hezbollah
or some of the Iranian proxies offer more than a military
presence, and I would like you to expand on that.
My fourth question, if you get to it, is where do you see
Russia fitting in to all of this.
Mr. Poe. You have 5 minutes. [Laughter.]
Mr. Nerguizian. Ms. Frankel, if you don't mind, I will take
only two of those four.
On your second question on aid, we have to factor in that
Hezbollah is the byproduct of 30-plus years of unfettered
focussed asymmetric security systems by Iran.
It's no surprise that they are as capable as they are. In
countries like Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, you have a mix of
different relationships with militaries.
But many of those are starting to bear fruit now, as I
pointed out in my testimony. I think that there needs to be a
serious consideration to what the impact will be of not just
curtailing security systems programs under FMF to countries in
the Middle East, but the 40-plus countries around the world
that would be affected.
This, basically, impacts how the United States can shape
and mentor emerging partners in the Middle East, especially
fighting militaries like the one I described.
I would even challenge Ken a little bit on the analysis in
part because Hezbollah's key strengths are its unity of effort,
its cohesive decision making, and the will to act.
Most militaries in the region have that but don't have a
fight worth fighting. In the case of Lebanon with ISIS, you had
a unique opportunity for one military to show that it has
broken the mold.
On the issue of Russia, ultimately, there are--there are
still a lot of intangibles. There are countries where it's far
more difficult for Russia to cement its role and its influence.
We don't see that in places like Lebanon in any credible
fashion. They understand the complexities of engaging in a
country like Jordan where the U.S. has lasting long-term
equities.
And even in Syria, they, I think, are very much aware that
they can certainly float the Assad regime. But they don't have
the resources or the wherewithal to manage or micromanage the
complexities of a divided society like Syria, let alone the
enormous reconstruction costs.
At some point, other countries will have to step in and
there will be a vital U.S. role.
Ms. Frankel. Does somebody else want to answer any of the
questions? How about the--how about the--leaving the JCPOA and
the reduction of the USAID and the State Department?
Ms. Dalton. Ma'am, I'd be happy to answer both of those.
In my opinion, walking away from the JCPOA is not in the
national security interests of the United States. It is
absolutely in the interest of the U.S. to stay with the nuclear
agreement.
If you take the JCPOA off the table, you reintroduce the
nuclear dimension to this issue set that we've been describing,
which makes it incredibly more dangerous and escalatory for all
parties in the region, for our presence there, for the
potential for an Israeli preventive strike to prevent the
Iranians from achieving a nuclear weapon.
So it is absolutely important that we uphold the deal. That
said, there are some concerns about the sunset clauses in terms
of missile development. But I believe that those issues should
be negotiated----
Ms. Frankel. Can you just answer--I'm sorry--get to the
USAID question because we are running out of time.
Ms. Dalton. Absolutely.
Ms. Frankel. Yes.
Ms. Dalton. When it comes to the State Department and
USAID, I believe that we need to reinforce the resourcing for
both department and agency.
They are absolutely critical institutions to addressing the
governance and resiliency gaps in the Arab world that Iran is
very ably exploiting and into which it is able to insert its
proxy elements.
Mr. Poe. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Mast.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
So I want to start with some of the broader implications
that were mentioned here. I think that was a great word to use.
And so I'd just start with maybe a--not yes or no but a quick
short opinion from each one of you.
Do you think that Iran sees these as colonies? Sees their
proxies as colonies? Do you think maybe we are using the wrong
word?
Mr. Knights. Speaking for Iraq, yes. I mean, they have
economically colonized parts of the Iraqi economy. They are a
bit like the East India Company, once upon a time.
They are actually a moneymaking venture as well as a
military intelligence venture.
Mr. Nerguizian. In the case of Lebanon, they're going to
run up against the wall that no single faction and no single
community, as in the case of Lebanon's divided political
landscape, has ever been able to take preeminence.
As powerful as Hezbollah is, it can't take over Lebanon,
and Lebanon can't become a colony state of Iran.
What you have is a country where they are just going to try
to maintain a strategic posture to deterrence.
Mr. Mast. What about any other place they have proxies? For
you.
Mr. Nerguizian. In the case of Yemen, there comes a point
where you have buyer's remorse. There is no reason why a
country like Iran is going to sustain a level of engagement
with countries like Yemen where you have far--a far more
expeditionary footprint, where they own the problems of the
region.
And in a place like Iraq, it's far more complex than I
think a lot of the Iranian leadership expected, given the--
given their own challenges of managing Sunni-Shi'a tensions in
a place like Iraq.
Mr. Mast. But you did just point out as well that they have
a very long-term view. Hezbollah, you pointed out, 30 years in
the making--I mean, they very clearly have an ability to look
down the road quite a long ways.
Dr. Pollack and Ms. Dalton.
Mr. Pollack. I will just say I think it runs the gamut,
Congressman. There are groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
which are clear proxies of Iran. Then the Houthis, who I
described as allies.
And even within a place like Iraq, you know, you have a
range from the Badr Corps to Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq to Kata'ib
Hezbollah running a range of how tied in they are to Iran--how
much Iran can control them--how much they have their own
interests.
Ms. Dalton. I think the Houthis are a really good example
of a group that is on perhaps the other end of the spectrum in
terms of a way for Iran to, in a low-cost fashion, disrupt one
of their key adversaries in the region, which is Saudi Arabia.
But the Houthis are not a true proxy in the sense--or
colony in the sense that perhaps Lebanese Hezbollah, some of
the groups in Iraq are. So, again, to the point not all proxies
are created equal.
Mr. Mast. Certainly not.
Switching gears but sticking with the theme of broader
implications, a general question--I'd love to, again, have the
opinion from all four of you.
It certainly hasn't been lack of desire to develop nuclear
weapons. What has prevented Iran from developing nuclear
systems, something that we developed in the 1940s?
We mastered it by the 1950s and '60s. The delivery systems
for them, whether it be via submarine, dropping it out of an
aeroplane or firing it out of a silo, we developed that--you
know, mastered by, you know, '60s and '70s for sure.
What has prevented them from developing that? We did it in
the '40s. How come they haven't been able to?
Mr. Pollack. Congressman, that's a big question that
deserves a better answer than I can give you. But I will say
that it is a combination of different factors, starting with
the fact that their scientific establishment isn't as good as
ours.
But adding to that the fact that we didn't have a much
bigger, more powerful country like the United States and allies
like Israel, the Europeans, Saudi Arabia, et cetera, all
working as hard as they could to prevent Iran from acquiring
the scientific know-how, the technology, and the resources to
do so.
Mr. Mast. What do you think is most important to get
scientific know-how and technology? I would say resources.
Mr. Pollack. That would be a very good start. I mean, as
we've seen with other countries, if the resources are there,
the scientific know-how may follow.
Mr. Mast. So if we have potential colonization of the
Middle East and an Iranian empire that has much greater access
to the world economy, do we have access to much more resources
in Iran?
Mr. Nerguizian. At the end of the day, Mr. Mast, we are
still living in a dollarized economy. And one of the problems
that Iran is continuing to struggle with is its ambitions are
constantly curtailed by the fact that it has to work in a
dollar economy.
That's why the mix of sanctions not only on Iran but its
proxies in the region, if not carefully calibrated--and they
are, in many ways--they can have a detrimental effect on moving
Iran outside the dollar economy.
In many ways, that is one of the most powerful weapons that
a country like the United States can deploy to limit the
ambitions and the ability to amass the resources you described.
Mr. Mast. We had Dr. Knights mention that he thought there
was resources coming in as a result of what I would point
toward as colonization.
In your opinion, do you think that there are more resources
now post-JCPOA or less post-JCPOA?
Mr. Nerguizian. Frankly, I could not make an informed
statement to that effect without having the adequate knowledge
on that.
Mr. Knights. Some of the actions that they undertake out in
the environments where the Iranian-backed militias are active
are just to self-finance those projects so that they're less of
a drain on the Iranian military and economy.
But, yeah, the opening of Iran to international investment
is going to put a massive shot in the arm of the entire system.
Mr. Mast. My time has expired. I thank you for your
answers.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Florida.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Zeldin.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Knights, I had a question, going back to your opening
statement.
You had a couple of consecutive lines. I just want you to
clarify so I can understand. One line was about staying in the
nuclear deal. The next line was the more we give, the more we
get.
What were you referring to when you were saying that?
Mr. Knights. What I was referring to is that we want the
Europeans on side. The best we ever did with Iran was when we
had numerous European countries and the international court of
world opinion on our side. That's when we brought really
crippling sanctions into place.
Thus, as we are looking to do things like counter threat
financing against Hezbollah networks, for instance, or bringing
more pressure on Iran about missiles, what we really want to be
doing is attracting European partners, not by being soft on
Iran in the nuclear deal but by approaching--by doing a step-
by-step process, first, perhaps decertify INARA which I think
is a good step, but then hold out the threat of further
additional sanctions or stopping waivers to try and--a step-by-
step process of trying to gain European support. Failing that,
threatening something that they don't want to happen.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you.
Ms. Dalton, gave a--started to give a strong defense of the
nuclear deal. Did you support the nuclear deal originally?
Ms. Dalton. Yes.
Mr. Zeldin. Okay. And just several factors that are
important, I guess, to understand.
First off, are you aware that we didn't even ask Iran for
its signature on the JCPOA?
Ms. Dalton. Yes.
Mr. Zeldin. Have you read the verification agreement
between the IAEA and Iran?
Ms. Dalton. Not in detail. I'm not a nonproliferation
expert. But not in detail.
Mr. Zeldin. Okay. You probably haven't read it at all,
right?
Ms. Dalton. I have--I understand the basic frame of it.
Mr. Zeldin. Okay. Well, when we were at a House Foreign
Affairs Committee hearing and Secretary Kerry was testifying,
he admitted that he hadn't even read it because--and no one
here in Congress has read it yet either because none of us had
it.
So defending how it's a strong unprecedented verification
regime, it's important to note that no one knows what the
verification regime is. It still hasn't been provided.
I'm sure one of the reasons why you'd be supported of the
nuclear deal is that uranium was taken out of the country?
Ms. Dalton. That is my understanding of one of the key
provisions.
Mr. Zeldin. Do you know where the uranium is?
Ms. Dalton. Again, this is not my issue area but I would
welcome your insight.
Mr. Zeldin. Well, you are here testifying in strong defense
of the nuclear deal and these are just important factors to
consider.
You're aware that U.S. weapons inspectors are not allowed
on any of the inspection teams, correct?
Ms. Dalton. Again, I--this is not my particular area of
expertise. But as the JCPOA pertains to a broader approach for
Iran, I am--I am supportive of the deal.
Mr. Zeldin. Okay. And Iran is responsible for collecting
some of their own soil samples, inspecting some of their own
nuclear sites.
This regime gets praised for how in Iran they elected the
most moderate candidates. Oftentimes, as you see that in the
American media or in conversations amongst the American public
in the international community, they negate the fact that the
12,000 most moderate candidates weren't even granted access to
the--to the ballot.
I actually believe that the Iran nuclear deal is more so a
blueprint for how Iran gets to a nuclear weapon than a
blueprint for preventing them from having a nuclear weapon.
But putting the nuclear piece aside, there is a shared
concern here, obviously, all four of you with the bad
activities Iran has been engaging in in the region and the
leverage that brought the Iranians to the table.
They were desperate for that sanctions relief by us not
involving any of Iran's other bad activities, and negotiating
the sanctions relief, unfortunately, has put us in a position
where we do not have the leverage to deal with Iran's other bad
activities.
So we have to figure out what more we can do with placing
leverage back on the table in ways that we don't have right
now.
I would also suggest that we are propping up the wrong
regime in Iran, and in 2009 when millions of Iranians took to
the streets to protest an undemocratic election, millions of
Iranians, we said it was none of our business.
And it very much was. The next time that this happens--the
fact is, it's a very different dynamic in Iran, it seems, than
North Korea. North Korea, if you have a tour guide taking you
around Pyongyang and you walk inside an elevator, the tour
guide will stop.
The face--the demeanor will change and he'll say, Kim Jong-
un was once on this elevator. They have this awe of their
leader in North Korea, and there's an information effort that's
needed there in Iran.
You have millions of Iranians who want to lead their
country in a better way, and I think that's something else to
consider not just with Iran's activities in other countries but
the ways that Iran, I think, is ready to change their behavior
from within.
Next time that opportunity comes for us to weigh in and
possibly help influence that, hopefully it has a different
outcome for the other Iranians who want to lead their country
in a much better direction.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize for being a little bit late to the hearing.
We've got double billings all the time. So if I ask something
that's redundant, please feel free to say, we already answered
that.
But I'm taking a look at what I was handed about the Iran
and the different influences it has in different parts of that
part of the world.
Do you think--did the fact that we have freed up over a
$100 billion to this regime--has that increased at all the
level of activity in these other areas that seem to be in
turmoil?
Mr. Knights. So just to kick off, some of the Iranian-
backed militia operations are very economical. In Iraq, it is
run on an absolute shoestring.
So in Iraq, I wouldn't say money is the major factor there
but it may play a role in the 2018 elections in Iraq where they
can----
Mr. Rohrabacher But has the money gone--has the extra money
that Iran has impacted on the pro, let's say, the Shi'ite
military movements in Iraq?
Mr. Knights. That's what I'm saying. I don't think it has
had an impact there. They're not playing with money there.
But in Syria, I think it's had a critical impact because
Syria is a very expensive operation for Iran, which my
colleagues might be able to detail a little more.
Mr. Nerguizian. My comment would be narrowly in the context
of Hezbollah and Lebanon.
You have an organization that has relied on a sustained
network around the world for its financing operations. It does
not need a massive infusion of funding from Iran.
Iran can choose to----
Mr. Rohrabacher I'm not asking about a massive infusion.
I'm saying that when somebody gets $100 billion in their hands
and they are in touch with people who are engaged in conflicts,
have the Iranians then used that money in those conflicts with
their--the friends that in conflict?
Mr. Knights. Precisely that's why they won't use it in a
place like Lebanon. You have so much already invested over----
Mr. Rohrabacher Okay. So they're not doing it in Lebanon?
Mr. Knights. They don't need to, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher They--when you see that they're--your
colleague there suggested they're doing that in however----
Mr. Knights. In Syria, certainly.
Mr. Rohrabacher With Syria, we are talking about. Now, what
about----
Mr. Knights. I would agree with Dr. Knights on that. That
is the one area where, frankly, there needs to be--if you're
Iran, if there are areas where you need to focus your financial
resources beyond your own economy----
Mr. Rohrabacher Okay. The others could get a chance to--is
that money being used--$100 billion, we've given to a regime
that basically thinks they are getting their direction from God
and that the rest of us are infidels and they came to power
chanting, ``Death to America''?
Mr. Pollack. Congressman, I think the reason that we are
all having difficulty with it is that the Iranian budget is
large enough and the costs of these kinds of operations is
small enough that we can't say specifically that the Iranians
would use any money that they got as a result of the JCPOA for
this versus that, right. We don't have access to the Iranian
budget.
Mr. Rohrabacher Money is fungible, right. If you----
Mr. Pollack. Exactly.
Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. Give somebody $100 billion or
free up $100 billion that they now have to use, if they're
using now some other money to murder people or to give support
to organizations that go out and use violence and force and
murder to, basically, push their agenda, well, then you have
actually financed that even though the money didn't come
directly--the dollar bills weren't the same dollar bills.
Mr. Pollack. Again, we are experts. We are called to give
you the truth as best we understand it. I think we are all
reticent to say that yes, literally, this dollar went to this
source as opposed to that source.
But there certainly has been an increase in Iranian support
over the last 2 years for various groups around the region. As
my colleagues have pointed out----
Mr. Rohrabacher Let me--various armed groups----
Mr. Pollack. Correct.
Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. Around the region. Okay. Now,
let me--and before we go on, because I know I only got a couple
minutes here--40 seconds. All right.
Well, instead of that, let me just say there are Azaris in
Iran who are not Persians and they are--and there are Baluch
and there are Kurds--there are more Kurds, I understand, in
Iran than there are in Iraq, for example.
Doesn't it--for those of us who really want peace in Iran,
doesn't it behove us not to just give--free up $100 billion for
the regime that oppresses its people, but instead to try to
help those interest--those various nationality groups that
don't like the mullahs?
Shouldn't we be, instead of--and how do you say, giving the
mullahs more, shouldn't we actually be spending more time and
effort trying to help those who oppose the mullahs like the
groups I just mentioned?
Mr. Pollack. I'll say, Congressman, those are clearly areas
of great sensitivity to the Iranian regime. And if the United
States is looking for ways to put pressure on Iran, those are
things that would certainly constitute real pressure points for
them.
Mr. Rohrabacher We could do it----
Mr. Poe. Gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Rohrabacher That's the bottom line of it. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. Gentleman's time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Rohrabacher.
The Chair recognizes itself for 5 minutes, and I thank you
all for being here.
I want to try to summarize some of the things that all the
other members have already pointed out.
Before I do that, though, I want to recognize here in the
audience Nazeen Hamamada, who is a Syrian refugee who has been
tortured by the Syrian Government for over 15 months and is now
here in the United States. Thank you for being here today.
The ayatollah has made it clear that it's his goal to
destroy Israel and then destroy the United States by any means
necessary.
Do any of you disagree that that is his goal? I believe him
when he says that. Do any of you think oh, he's just making
that up?
Okay. I take it by your silence that most of you agree with
that philosophy.
The United States is involved in a lot of places, as has
been pointed out, trying to, in essence, thwart the Iranian
influence. The land bridge--some say that that land bridge is
important to Iran because they then have a land route to
Israel. That may or may not be true.
Secretary Tillerson testified at a hearing in the Foreign
Affairs Committee and I asked him the question, if it were the
policy of the United States to have a regime change in Iran and
he indicated in the affirmative, that it was the goal.
He didn't say how. He just said regime change. I personally
think that is the answer as well, as Mr. Zeldin pointed out.
The people of Iran, in my opinion. Would like to control
their own government and not be dictated by the mullahs and the
ayatollah. That's the safest--safest way for there to be peace
is in the regime change in Iran with the people getting to make
those decisions.
Why should the United States even be involved in thwarting
Iranian influence in the Middle East? Why should it not just be
our policy that's their problem--the Middle East? That's the
Saudis' problem. That's the people in the Middle East--that's
their problem.
Except for Israel. Set that issue aside in our ally,
Israel. Set that aside. Why should we be involved in any of
these efforts?
Dr. Knights, do you want to answer that question?
Mr. Knights. It's always been the case that you may not be
interested in the Middle East, but the Middle East becomes
interested in you at some point.
Whether it's terrorism coming out of the Middle East,
whether it's nuclear weapons, whether it's proliferation of
nuclear weapons between our allies, Saudi Arabia and Turkey,
and maybe one day Egypt getting nuclear weapons, too--whether
it's the energy resources coming out of the Middle East, these
are all things that can affect America directly and have
affected America directly, whether we wanted them to or not,
and that'll continue to be the case.
Mr. Poe. Anybody else want to weigh in on that? Dr.
Pollack.
Mr. Pollack. Simply echo Mike's points, and in particular,
I want to emphasize the point that none of us likes to talk
about, which is the region's energy resources and use the dirty
word oil.
While we now are exporting more than we import, the simple
fact is that the global economy floats on a sea of oil, and as
long as our critical trading partners remain dependent on oil
and as long as the global oil market has an enormous component
of Middle Eastern oil, we are going to have to care about the
Middle East because it is going to affect our economy.
We need to remember that whether we like it or not, our
worst economic crises since the second World War had typically
been preceded by some major fluctuation in the price of oil.
Mr. Poe. Well, we are energy independent because we in
Texas have more oil than we know what to do with and we sell it
to anybody that'll buy it.
But anyway, not to be lighthearted, I personally think that
there are many reasons why the United States needs to be
involved in the Middle East.
I would just hope that the people--other countries in the
Middle East would recognize that they have a responsibility
because it's their region to, in a peaceful way, stabilize the
region, not just for now but in the future as well.
I mean, it's been--since '48 or before has been a powder
keg, and I think there are a lot of economic reasons and
political reasons why we should be involved there and thwart
whatever influence we--thwart the influence of Iran, especially
with its proxy groups. Some are better than others but at the
end of the day we have to come to the conclusion, I think, the
realization that Iran means it when they say they want to
destroy us.
And the long-term answer I don't think is a military one.
But we have to figure out a way to solve this very complex
massive and getting more difficult every day issue.
I want to recognize the--Mr. Schneider as well. But I do
need to excuse myself for another meeting as well, and Colonel
Cook will take over in his military way as the chair in the
subcommittee.
So Mr. Schneider, the Chair recognizes you for 5 minutes.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Chairman Poe, and I apologize for
not being here for your public statements. I have reviewed your
submitted statements and I appreciate very much what you've
said, how you've said it, and have probably 4 to 5 hours of
questions. I will try to squeeze them into 5 minutes.
But, Dr. Knights, I will start with you. This really is for
everyone. But you talk about Iran projecting its force in the
region, and I missed the discussion of the map but it's pretty
clear what this is showing in Iran's efforts.
My colleague from Texas talked about why do we care. But
Iran has a strategy. It has an objective that extends beyond
its borders.
It does affect not just our allies but our interests. And
so, I guess, for the whole panel, beyond just saying we need to
stand up to it, what specific steps would you advise to this
administration, to Congress, to take to push back on Iran's
malign influence in the region?
Mr. Knights. Maybe moving down the line quickly, one of the
things we need to do is to create a buffer zone in which there
are no Iranian or Iranian-backed forces on the borders of
Israel and southern Syria.
We need to create a sustainable self-defensive pocket there
that can ensure that Iranian-backed militias do not extend
across another new huge swathe of Israel's border.
We also need to help Iraq to push back on the Iranian-
backed militias that could potentially take over the country as
a form of new Hezbollah or a new Revolutionary Guard within
that country.
Those would be the two main things. I also think we need to
end the Yemeni war with the Gulf coalition because that's
turning a group of sometimes allies of Iran into potential
proxies of Iran.
It's still at an early stage. The cement is not wet. We can
still prevent something bad from happening there.
Mr. Schneider. Just to clarify, you're drawing a
distinction, I think it's important to point out, between
allies and proxies. And allies have their own interests--
proxies operate on--I don't want to put words in your mouth.
My assumption--allies have their own interests. Proxies
operate under the instructions of the mullahs in Iran.
Mr. Knights. Correct, and we need to act quickest where
Iran has shallow-rooted influence--places like Yemen, Bahrain,
Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Nerguizian. Congressman, you have U.S. partners in the
region that are starting to assert themselves in the context of
their own national environment.
In my own testimony, I focused specifically on the counter
ISIS campaign of the Lebanese military, which was, to me, as
someone who witnessed it first hand, exceptional in terms of
its unity of effort, the lack of--lack of coordination with any
third party.
When you have a military that wants to do the heavy lifting
in the region, when it wants to act responsibly, when it wants
to add to the metrics of stability in the region. Partners like
that, and I use the term partners--should be empowered.
You don't empower them by not giving them the tools to be
effective and by not thinking strategically over the long term.
We cannot engage partners like the LAF and others in the region
from fiscal year to fiscal year.
We need to take a page out of the Iranian play book and
think long term, as difficult as that is, about the kinds of
relationships and friendships that the United States is trying
to create.
Mr. Schneider. When you say long-term, I think it's
important. Tell me what time frame you have in mind that we
should be thinking as policy makers in addressing what is
looking backwards--conflicts that don't date decades or
centuries but literally millennia.
Mr. Nerguizian. I will use the example of the LAF again.
The LAF is now thinking in 5- to 10-year increments about what
kind of force it wants to become, and that's a realistic
assessment of just how we should see countries like Lebanon,
like Jordan, like Egypt, relative to U.S. engagement.
You're looking at 5-, 10-year tranches where you have to
have a coherent set of policy choices. Our friends in the
United Kingdom do that very well.
The United States needs to be much better doing that.
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Pollack.
Mr. Pollack. Congressman, first I want to agree with the
comments of both of my colleagues. Both Mike and Aram have made
excellent points.
What I want to add to that is the importance of dealing
with the underlying economic, social, and political problems of
the Middle East.
As I said in my opening remarks and my written remarks,
Iran doesn't create the problems of the region. It simply
exploits them. If you want to stop Iran, we need to help the
countries of the region deal with these problems.
Now, the great news is that we finally have allies in the
region who are taking these problems seriously for the first
time ever, in particular Saudi Vision 2030. We have no idea
whether it's going to succeed.
But we should all be praising the crown prince for
beginning this process and we as a nation should be trying to
help him to move it forward and create the conditions under
which it has the best chance of success.
Then there are other allies like Morocco and Jordan, who
have been half-hearted at best. They need to be encouraged and
enabled.
But at the end of the day, the problem that we face is that
for too long the Middle East has been faced with a choice
between repression or revolution, and the Iranians take
advantage of both and the right answer is the third way, which
is reform. That is the way that you shut them out.
Mr. Schneider. Ms. Dalton.
Ms. Dalton. Great, if we still have time. Okay.
Mr. Schneider. I'll say thank you, and we can--we can talk
another time. I appreciate your comments. I think the
importance of looking long term, beyond just the next quarter
or year or, in our case, the next election, understanding that
we have broad interests in the region that we need to work with
our partners is critical.
So thank you for that and I appreciate the time. I yield
back.
Mr. Cook [presiding]. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, the
ranking member, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I just want to--I have a quick question regarding Russia's
involvement. Perhaps Ms. Dalton.
How is it currently undermining stability--Russia--right
now in terms of our security and stability and, you know, how
is it opening up opportunities for Iran in the region and what
can we do directly with Russia?
Ms. Dalton. I think this is a really timely question, and
the United States is only beginning to wrap its head around
what the implications are of the Russian intervention into
Syria in 2015.
Certainly, Russia's support for Assad has allowed, as I
believe you said in your opening remarks, Iran to not have to
devote as many resources to support Assad because they have
been working together and there is a convergence of interest
when it comes to Syria that I think we have to see play out
over time in terms of how replicable that relationship is going
to be.
Iran and Russia, of course, have a very mixed history
dating back to the 19th century. They are not natural allies
and there is still that sort of historic enmity that I think
underlies the current relationship.
But yet, what they share in common and I think what we need
to not lose sight of is that they are both motivated by
exploiting vulnerabilities and gaps in the region where U.S.
presence has receded, where our relationships with partners has
fractured, where governance is weak, and they are working
together to exploit those gaps in ways that I think are going
to be harmful for our interests and those of our allies and
partners.
Mr. Keating. They are also using that influence, as is
Iran, for propaganda purposes in the area as well. What could
the United States do--any of panellists--you know, to really
better counter that propaganda influence? Because it really
falls into line with our ability to not let them take advantage
of these situations.
Ms. Dalton. I will take a quick crack at it and then open
it up.
I think that, you know, while we need to not lose sight of
this challenge, it's also important not to overly inflate their
capabilities, their resourcing.
Both of these countries are not necessarily economically
set up well to be a superpower in the region. So, you know, not
presenting them as a bogeyman looking for opportunities to use
our own information and operations and working with partners in
the region to expose the weaknesses from an economic
perspective in terms of the long-term sustainability of these
activities, I think, will be critical.
Mr. Keating. Anyone else have a comment on that?
Mr. Knights. As they say, sunshine is the best antiseptic.
There's a lot that we can--there is a lot of information we've
never used about Iranian-backed militias, and it's not gathered
through sensitive means or at least they're not sensitive
anymore--things we knew back from the days of Iraq when we were
there.
There's things we know about Iranian-backed militia leaders
in Iraq, about the fact that they've killed so many Iraqi
citizens--they have Iraqi blood on their hands.
We can prove it. I don't think we expose enough.
Mr. Keating. Right, and I do think, too, that the comment
that both of their economies are not doing well certainly makes
it right for us pointing that out and actually pointing out
alternative areas with that--you know, with their way of life
in those countries is not what it could be if they adopted a
lot of our values--at least shared a lot of our values.
So I want to thank the panel and I yield back.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
On behalf of the Chair and the committee, I want to thank
all four members.
We covered a lot of subjects today, being very patient with
us and we covered a lot of ground.
Thank you again for being with us. This meeting is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:54 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
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[all]